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I. INTRODUCTION 
. Imagine the world of the 1850's in Texas. Especially, imagine the law 
of Texas in those decades even before "Judge" Roy Bean had proclaimed 
himself justice of the peace. I So remote is that time and setting, and so 
volatile is the law of criminal procedure, that it is hard to conceive of a statute 
from that age surviving the intervening century-and-a-half. Nevertheless, a 
current exception to Texas's arrest warrant requirement can be traced directly 
to a virtually identical statute from those pre-Civil War days when the 
Supreme Court of the United States sat in "dingy quarters" in the basement of 
the Capitol, and Chief Justice Roger Taney's Court produced the now-
infamous decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 
• Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Legal Studies, St. Mary's 
University School of Law; B.A., Trinity University; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University School 
of Law. 
I deeply appreciate the research assistance of Sarah Bredemeier and Thalassia Babers, both of whom 
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I. Roy Bean assumed the judicial title in 1882. The reference to • Judge" Bean is intended only 
to establish context, and not to suggest that Texas law in the nineteenth century was influenced 
significantly by this colorful figure. 
2. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 69 (1993); 60 U.S. 393, 454 
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When the language ofthe current article 14.03(a)(1) of the Texas Code 
of Criminal Procedure first appeared in Texas law, landmark decisions like 
Terry v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona were more than a century in the future.3 
The criminal procedure "revolution" of the Warren Court could not have been 
imagined by frontier Texas lawmakers.4 It is a small wonder that today's 
courts find the statute confusing; and confusion, whether advertent or 
inadvertent, invites result-oriented, illogical, or unpersuasive judicial 
decisions.s Courts' attempts to make sense of article 14.03(a)(1) arguably 
have failed in each of these ways over the statute's long life.6 
II. TEXAS'S ARREST WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
To understand the current statute, one must consider not only its origins, 
but the framework of procedural rules in which it is set. It has been said that 
"Texas law's most pervasive requirement regarding detentions is its demand 
for an arrest warrant."7 The preference in Texas law that arrests be made 
pursuant to a warrant is long-standing and strong.8 This preference is just one 
of the ways in which Texas criminal procedure law differs from the Fourth 
(1856). 
3. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I) (Vernon Supp. 2000); 392 U.S. 1,30 (1968); 
384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966). 
4. See Bruce G. Burner, Criminal Procedure in the Current Term, 33 VAL. U.L. REv. 23, 24 
(1998); Daniel Givelber, Litigating State Capital Cases While Preserving Federal Questions: Can It Be 
Done Successfolly?, 29 ST. MARY's LJ. 1009, 1021 (1998); Kermit L. Hall, The Wa"en Court: Yesterday, 
Today, and Tomo"ow, 28 IND. L. REv. 309, 320 (1995); Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism: 
Translating the Guarantees o/Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1193,1196 (1998); 
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two 
Answers,94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2506 (1996). The Warren Court "revolution" describes a body of 
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren that 
reshaped constitutional interpretation in many fields of public law, but perhaps most notably in 
constitutional criminal procedure. See Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 28 IND. L. REv. 309, 320 (1995). The term is used repeatedly, and with apparent wide-
understanding, to characterize a dramatic shift toward recognition of individual rights. See id. 
5. See Gerald S. Reamey, Up in Smoke: Fourth Amendment Rights and the Burger Court, 45 
OKLA. L. REv. 57, 60-63 (1992) (explaining the strategic use of confusion in Fourth Amendment 
adjudication); Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs' Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit 
o/Law, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 322-26 (1992) (finding the deliberate use of "reasonableness" to 
diminish the scope and vitality of Fourth Amendment guarantees). 
6. See sources cited supra note 5. 
7. GEORGEE. DIX & ROBERTO. DAWSON, 40 TEXAS PRACTICE § 7.50 (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
8. See Randall v. Texas, 656 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ("[A] police officer should 
always obtain an arrest warrant when possible"); Hardison v. Texas, 597 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1980); Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 663-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (showing that the court 
begins with "the familiar constitutional precept" that peace officers should always obtain an arrest warrant); 
ROBERT R. BARTON, TEXAS SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.021 (2d. ed. Supp. 1999); Gerald S. Reamey & 1. 
Daniel Harkins, Warrantless Arrest Jurisdiction in Texas: An Analysis and a Proposal, 19 ST. MARY'S 
LJ. 857, 860 (1988) (illustrating that courts in Texas begin with the premise that the Texas Constitution 
requires an arrest by warrant); Dlx& DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50. 
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Amendment's requirements.9 Whether the warrant requirement is mandated 
by the Texas Constitution or by statute has been subject to debate.1O However, 
the proposition that a warrant is necessary in the absence of excusing 
circumstances was not questioned until 1998. 11 
III. NEW FEDERALISM 
Riding the crest of "new federalism," the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals made clear in Heitman v. Texas that the Texas Constitution is an 
independent compact with the citizens of the state which may provide greater 
protections than the United States Constitution, even when the language of the 
two charters is virtually identical. I2 Arguably, new federalism and Heitman 
9. See GERALD s. REAMEY & CHARLES P. BUBANY, TExAs CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20-21 (5th ed. 
1999). Stating this difference Reamey and Bubany said: 
[d. 
Warrantless arrests are commonplace in Texas, as in other jurisdictions, despite the relatively 
strong preference that exists for arrest by warrant. The significance of this preference in Texas 
is illustrated by comparison of Texas law with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
which ostensibly contains a similar preference. The federal constitution has been interpreted 
to pennit a warrantless arrest in a "public place: even if the officer could easily have obtained 
a warrant. United States \I. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). By contrast, in Texas arrest without 
warrant must be justified by the existence of explicit statutory authority. Dejarnette \I. Texas, 
732 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Warrantless arrests for many kinds of 
misdemeanor offenses are not generally pennitted, and even for more serious crimes, Texas law 
requires more than just probable cause and finding the offender in a public place. 
10. See Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 663. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals referred to the arrest 
warrant requirement as a "familiar constitutional precept," but did not explicate the basis in the Texas 
Constitution for this characterization. [d. However, the court did cite the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion in Beck \I. Ohio, wherein the Court suggested that "an after-the-event justification" for an arrest 
would undennine "the protections of the Fourth Amendment" and subject citizens to the unbridled 
discretion of the police. ld. at 664 n.1 (citing 379 u .S. 89, 96-97 (1964». Presumably, and for the same 
reasons, the guarantees contained in Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution are jeopardized by 
avoiding prior judicial authorization. See Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 860. Reliance on a strictly 
constitutional argument for requiring warrants, though, is not entirely satisfactory. See id. If either 
constitution requires an arrest warrant, then how can a court engraft exceptions on the rule, and what 
authorizes the Texas Legislature to give statutory pennission for warrantless arrests? See id. Perhaps the 
answer is that both constitutions require "reasonableness" rather than warrants, and that a warrant is simply 
one way to demonstrate compliance with the reasonableness requirement. See generally Gerald S. 
Reamey, When "Special Needs· Meet Probable Cause: Denying the De\lil Benefit 0/ Law, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 295, 300-01 (1992) (analyzing the Federal Constitution). Hence, there often is said to be a 
preference for warrants, rather than a requirement. See id. In any event, it seems clear from the substantial 
body of case law reiterating the warrant preference, as well as from the frequent employment of statutory 
exceptions to justifY warrantless arrests, that at least a strong preference for warrants is finnly entrenched 
in Texas law. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50; Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 860. This 
continuing debate over the source of the requirement or preference was altered rather dramatically in 1998 
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution does 
not require warrants. See HuHt v. Texas, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); discussion infra 
Parts VI-X. 
II. See Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 431. 
12. 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see M. P. Duncan III, Terminating the Guardianship: 
A New Role/or State Courts, 19 ST. MARY'S LJ. 809, 832-56 (1988). Writing for the Heitman court, 
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were responses to the so-called Ucounter-revolution"~ounter to the criminal 
procedure "revolution" of the Warren Court-taking place in the increasingly 
conservative United States Supreme Court. I) Whatever its genesis, the core 
principle of cases like Heitman was that the federal constitution is a floor 
rather than a ceiling, and that states are free to offer their citizens more, but 
not less, protection from the state than does the United States Constitution. 14 
Relatively little came of Heitman, perhaps because the elected Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals itself took a conservative tum. However, there 
was no indication that the guiding principle of new federalism would not 
continue as a kind of "life preserver" to be used in case the diminution of 
privacy guarantees by the federal judiciary became intolerable. What was not 
foreseen was that the core principle of Heitman would be stood on its head by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals only seven years later in a case styled 
Hulit v. Texas. ls 
IV. HULIT V. TEXAS AND THE "NEW" NEW FEDERALISM 
Hulit presented an unusually "pure" claim that Article I, Section 9 of the 
Texas Constitution-the state analogue to the Fourth Amendment-had been 
violated. 16 Police officers were dispatched to investigate a report that a driver 
Judge Miller explained: 
This Court has repeatedly recognized that Art. J, § 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution are the same in all material aspects. The two 
provisions serve to safeguard individuals' privacy and security against arbitrary invasion by 
governmental officials. 
Under our system of federalism, however, the states are free to reject federal holdings as 
long as state action does not fall below the minimum standards provided by federal 
constitutional protections. Likewise, a state is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater 
restrictions on police activity than those the Supreme Court holds to be necessary upon federal 
constitutional standards. 
815 S.W.2d at 682-83 (citations omitted). 
13. See THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 
1983); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1984); Gerald S. Reamey, 
Up in Smolce: FOIlrth Amendment Rights and the Burger Court, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 57, 60-63 (1992); cf 
Duncan III, supra note 12, at 845 (determining that the public is not receptive to the idea of "new 
federalism" because of conservative reaction to Warren Court's expansion of civil liberties). Whether, and 
to what extent, there was a "counter-revolution" beginning with the chief justiceship of Warren Burger 
continues to be the subject of much debate. 
14. See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 690 (citing leCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986) 
("The federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. State 
constitutions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, but they can 
provide additional rights to their citizens."»; Duncan III, supra note 12, at 855 (stating "[The1 Supreme 
Court merely sets the minimum standards with which the states must comply."). 
15. 982 S.W.2d at 440. Judge Baird, writing for the dissent in Hulil, referred to the court's later 
decision as a kind of "new" New Federalism, subject to the same claims of judicial activism raised against 
Heitman . ld. at 449 (Baird, J., dissenting). 
16. See id. at 433. 
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was possibly having a heart attack in a vehicle. 17 They found the defendant 
slumped over his steering wheel; and, after pounding on the windows and 
yelling, managed to rouse the man. 1B When the officers determined that the 
occupant of the vehicle was intoxicated, they arrested him for driving while 
intoxicated, a felony offense because of the defendant's prior convictions. 19 
Presumably because he thought he would fare better on his suppression 
issue under Texas law, Mr. Hulit withdrew a motion that had invoked both the 
Texas Constitution and United States Constitution, replacing it with a 
suppression motion based entirely on Texas law.20 He went so far as to tell 
"the trial court that the Texas Constitution and law ... are the only issues that 
are before the Court in this motion. "21 
On appeal, the court of criminal appeals noted its prior holding in 
Heitman to sidestep the appellant's reliance on an opinion from the United 
States Supreme Court.22 The court then turned to its novel interpretation of 
the Texas Constitution.2J For the first time, the court not only questioned the 
premise that a warrant requirement exists in Article I, Section 9, but actually 
found that there is no such requirement.24 
The court's holding that the Texas Constitution does not require a 
warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement, contradicts not only 
the express and implicit holding of numerous decisions, but also the principle 
that the Texas Constitution cannot subtract from rights guaranteed to Texas 
citizens by the United States Constitution.25 The majority acknowledged as 
much.26 However, it also reasoned that it was free to interpret the Texas 
17. See id. at 432. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 432-33. 
20. See id. at 433; cf id. at 442 (Price, 1., concurring) (explaining that the defendant invoked the 
Texas Constitution because "he reasonably believed that he would get at least the same amount of 
protection as that granted by the federal constitution, and perhaps even more"). 
21. /d. at 433 (omission in original). 
22. See id. at 434. 
23. See id. at 449 (Baird, 1., dissenting) (describing the court's decision as a kind of "new" New 
Federalism); see also id. at 441-42 (Price, J., concurring) (describing that Mr. Hulit relied on ·case law of 
more than fifty years"). 
Id. 
24. See id. at 436. Judge Womack, writing for five members of the court, concluded: 
It is our holding that Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution contains no 
requirement that a seizure or search be authorized by a warrant, and that a seizure or search that 
is otherwise reasonable will not be found to be in violation of that section because it was not 
authorized by a warrant. 
25. See Heitman v. Texas, 8\5 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In a rather formalistic 
and literal sense, of course, the principle remains intact. Texas law neither subtracts from nor adds to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment; it has an independent, and sometimes cumulative effect. See id. 
The substantive meaning of this principle had never before been viewed so narrowly as by the Hulit 
majority. See id. Texas courts prior to Hulit, including the court of criminal appeals, always announced 
the principle in a context suggesting that Article I, Section 9 contained at least the same protections as the 
Fourth Amendment and, as Heilman held, might contain more. See id. 
26. See Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 436-37. Judge Womack wrote, "We understand that our holding 
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Constitution in a manner entirely independent of its federal counterpart, even 
if that meant construing the state constitution as affording less protectionP 
Taking the broader view, it seems that the Hulit court viewed 
constitutional protections as analogous to insurance policies. A policyholder 
with two policies enjoys the protections provided by either, or perhaps by both 
combined, depending on her election when filing a claim. If policy A 
provides no hail damage coverage, but policy B does, then the policyholder 
with hail damage who neglects to file a claim under policy B simply forfeits 
benefits because she has made a bad choice. Each policy may provide less 
coverage in some areas than the other because each represents a completely 
separate and independent relationship between the insurer and insured. So 
too, Texas is free to provide less "coverage" than the federal government, and 
if a Texas citizen chooses unwisely when making a claim, that is the price she 
pays for living in a federal system with dual sovereigns.28 
However, constitutions differ significantly from insurance policies.29 
means that Section 9 of our Bill of Rights does not offer greater protection to the individual than the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it may offer less protection." Id. 
27. See id. Robert Hulit apparently is just another victim of the adversarial system. Because he 
understandably did not predict that the court would interpret the Texas Constitution as providing less 
protection, his election to litigate and appeal on Texas law grounds was a poor choice for which he paid 
a high price. Although he would have fared no better on a claim that the Fourth Amendment requires an 
arrest warrant in his situation, he at least must have known that a federal claim was futile, something he 
could not have guessed from researching Texas law. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the language 
of the Texas Supreme Court in leCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986), that state 
constitutions set the ceiling for individual rights, while the federal constitution sets the floor. See id. at 
437. Judges Baird and Overstreet took a sharply different view of the meaning offederalism, arguing that 
"because the Fourth Amendment and United States Supreme Court are clear there is a warrant requirement, 
the Texas Constitution must at least require the same protection .. .. [W]e are free to interpret the Texas 
Constitution as bestowing greater protection than its federal counterpart, but we cannot interpret it as 
affording less protection." Id. at 444 (Baird, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Judge Price's 
concurrence also expressed reservations about this sudden shift in position, suggesting that doing so "may 
itself present some serious constitutional questions." Id. at 442 (Price, 1., concurring). 
28. See Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 437 (holding that the Texas Constitution's "ceiling" may not reach 
the federal constitution's "floor" in some respects). 
29. One way in which a constitution should not differ from an insurance policy is in providing 
reasonably clear understanding of what is promised and what is not. When an insurance policy does not 
provide the coverage that the insured expected, courts may be called upon to interpret the fair meaning of 
the policy's language. In this task, courts often consider the gloss that previously has been placed on the 
wording found in the policy. Because parties rely on these interpretations when entering into contracts, 
they often resort-and are sometimes criticized for doing so-to "boiler plate" language precisely because 
it is understood to have a certain meaning. Constitutions are like contracts between government and 
citizens in this respect, and the glacial pace at which interpretation of constitutions proceeds reflects the 
need to preserve consistency, clarity, and ultimately, fairness . To change the understanding of a 
fundamental concept without warning would not be tolerated by a court construing contract language, and 
is even more damaging when a constitutional guarantee is widely understood to exist. Imagine the 
surprise of Robert Hulit's lawyer to learn that no warrant is required by the Texas Constitution. See 
generally Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 436 (stating that the Texas Constitution does not require search or seizure 
warrants). This concern was captured in the concurring opinion of Judge Price who stated: 
For more than fifty years now, this Court has repeatedly stated that the 'search and seizure" 
provision of the Texas Constitution gives the citizens of Texas the same protection as the 
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The policyholder who has coverage under policy B, but who files a claim 
under policy A that is denied, may then file under policy B and recover her 
loss. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that this option is 
not available to citizens seeking the protection of the wrong constitution.30 If, 
as in Hulit, a defendant relies exclusively on Texas law, then the Fourth 
Amendment plays no part in the decision and cannot be asserted at some later 
date when the error becomes apparent. 3 I If instead, the defendant 
unsuccessfully invokes the Fourth Amendment, and then wants to assert 
Article I, Section 9, the Texas claim is precluded by her prior election.32 
Apparently, the only way to avoid the dire consequences resulting from 
a poor choice is simultaneously, and at every opportunity, to claim violations 
of both constitutions. The defendant in Hulit would not have benefitted from 
this strategy because the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment would not have required an arrest warrant in his situation.33 As 
it turned out, the Texas Constitution requires no arrest warrant in any case.34 
At least in cases in which the issue is whether the police should have secured 
a warrant prior to arresting or searching, the implication in Hulit is that 
defendants need not bother to make claims based on the Texas Constitution; 
they should rely exclusively on the Fourth Amendment.3s 
The Hulit court addressed only two comments in a single, short 
Fourth Amendment, and that it may give them greater protection. Clearly, appellant asked for 
protection only under the Texas Constitution because, relying on our case law of more than 
fifty years, he reasonably believed that he would get at least the same amount of protection as 
that granted by the federal constitution, and perhaps even more. To now ·pull the rug out· 
from under appellant and say that he gets less protection than that granted by the federal 
constitution may itself present some serious constitutional questions. 
Id. at 441-42 (price, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
30. See id. at 440 (Keller, J., concurri.ng). 
31 . See id. (stating that ·Having requested protection only under Article I § 9, however, appellant 
forfeited any protections he was entitled to under the Fourth Amendment.·) 
32. See White v. Texas, 543 S.W.2d 366,369-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). In While, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals agreed with appellant's contention that the search of his car violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 367. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was 
valid. See id. On remand, the appellant urged the court to find the search illegal under the Texas 
Constitution, but because appellant had not raised the Texas law claim at trial, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals refused to consider it. See id. at 369-70. 
33. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976) (determining that an arrest warrant 
is not required for a person found in a ·public place"). Assuming there was probable cause to detain 
Robert Hulit, the Fourth Amendment would have been satisfied by the fact that he was found in a ·public 
place.· See id. at 422-24. If there was no probable cause for Mr. Hulit, and the State was operating solely 
on a ·community caretaking function· theory, the defendant scarcely could have been encouraged by the 
considerable body of decisions from the United States Supreme Court approving warrantless ·special 
needs" searches and seizures. See Reamey, supra note 10, at 307-17. On the other hand, the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals has not recognized the ·community caretaking function· exception, or many of the 
other ·special needs· approved by the Supreme Court. See HU/it, 982 S.W.2d at 433. 
34. See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 436; supra text accompanying note 24. 
35. Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 436. 
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paragraph to the ramifications of its decision.36 In the first of these, the court 
suggested that a warrant might count in the totality of circumstances toward 
whether an arrest or search is reasonable.37 
However, it is a mere truism to say that the existence of a warrant counts 
in determining reasonableness.3• Surely it does count, but the question is 
whether it is sufficient by itself to conclusively establish reasonableness.39 In 
a "warrant required" regime, the answer clearly is that a properly issued 
warrant suffices.40 Because the warrant requirement is not absolute, narrowly 
defined exceptions delineate the circumstances under which something less 
than a warrant will do.41 To say that a warrant may be a factor in determining 
reasonableness hints that even a valid warrant may not suffice in some case.42 
Whether the court ultimately adopts this position or not, abandonment of the 
warrant requirement paradigm in favor of reasonableness invites dangerous 
ad hoc decision making by unguided trial courts and politically variable 
appellate benches.43 
The second reference to life in a post-Hulit world is an obscure 
admonition that the holding "is not to say that statutes which require warrants 
for seizure or search may be ignored."44 Implicit in this statement is 
recognition that the legislature may exercise its prerogative to establish a 
warrant requirement.4s The implication is captured in the comment of two 
prominent Texas criminal procedure commentators who summarized the 
meaning of Hulit as follows: 
As a consequence of Huiit, the Texas law of arrest demanding-as a 
general rule-an arrest warrant is only a matter of statutory mandate. 
Statutory exceptions are not subject to attack on the ground that they exceed 
what is permissible under article I, section [9] [sic] . The legislature would 
be free to simply abandon the general requirement that arrests be made 
36. [d. 
37. See id. 
38. See Reamey, supra note 10, at 327-30. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42 . See id. 
43 . See id.; cf HuHt v. Texas, 982 S.W.2d 431, 438-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Meyers, J., 
concurring) (stating that the court uses a ·balancing test" rather than a "bright-I ine rule"); DIX & DAWSON, 
supra note 7, § 10.06 (noting that the Hullt decision docs not explain what interests were at stake or how 
the court evaluated and balanced them). 
44. Hulit, 982 S. W.2d at 436. Wording its adjuration in this way leaves the impression that the 
court was unwilling even to state unreservedly that any such statutes must be observed. See id. Whether 
it intended to leave open this eventuality or not, the court cited no statutes requiring an arrest warrant; and, 
perhaps because the proposition that warrants arc required has been considered settled for so long, there 
appear currently to be none. See /d. 
45. See DIX& DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50. 
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pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.46 
Also implicit in the way in which the court dealt with Robert Hulit's claim, 
and the interpretation of these commentators, is a recognition that no statute 
currently exists clearly requiring an arrest warrant.4? That assumption, if it is 
one, does not address even obliquely the premise inherent within warrant 
exception statutes that generally a warrant is required.4B 
V. EXCEPTIONS WITHOUT A RULE 
The existence of article 14.03(a)(I) and the other arrest warrant 
exception statutes raise an obvious question about the Hulit decision: how to 
square the court's holding that the Texas Constitution requires no arrest 
warrant with the legislature's apparent belief, buttressed by more than a 
century of interpretive court decisions, that statutory exceptions are 
necessary.49 If there is no rule, why does Texas have exceptions to·the rule?SO 
Hulit focused exclusively on whether the Texas Constitution, and 
specifically Article I, Section 9, requires arrest by warrant.51 The court said 
nothing about the existence of common law or statutory authority for a 
warrant requirement, other than to acknowledge that a statutory requirement 
probably could not be ignored.52 
In the absence of any statutory requirement that arrests be made pursuant 
to a warrant, Texas is left in the anomalous position of having statutory limits 
on warrantless arrests, without having a corresponding statutory or 
constitutional duty to obtain a warrant.53 A peace officer contemplating an 
arrest apparently may choose to obtain a warrant or not, entirely free from any 
consequences or limitations if he chooses to forego the inconvenience of prior 
judicial approval.54 For obvious reasons, this interpretation seriously 
diminishes the likelihood that Texas will enjoy the protection afforded by 
warrants.55 
46. [d. 
47. See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 438; Dlx& DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50. 
48. See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d 8t438; DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50. 
49. See BARTON, supra note 8, § 1.021 (stating "[The] authority to arrest a suspect without a 
warrant is governed exclusivcly by statutc·). 
50. See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 438. 
51 . See id. at 434-36. 
52. See id. at 434-38. The only reference in the opinion to a statutory warrant requiremcnt, or thc 
cffect of one, is 8 warning that thc court's rejection ofthc constitutional argument is ·not to say· that 8 
statute requiring a WlllT8llt may be ignored. See id. at 436; see also DIX &: DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50 
(explaining that the Hulil court rulcd "[w]ithout carefully cxamining the possibility that Tcxas tradition 
had accepted a warrant rcquircmcnt at least for arrests.· ). 
53. See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 434-38. 
54. See Id. 
55. See id. 
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First and foremost, denigration of arrest warrants denigrates the right to 
be free from unreasonable seizures.s6 "A warrantless arrest bypasses the 
safeguards provided by the warrant procedure, including the review and 
objective determination of a detached magistrate of whether probable cause 
exists to justify the arrest. "S7 While the advantages provided by the warrant 
procedure do not always trump the necessities justifying police action without 
prior judicial review, "courts should strictly construe each statutory exception 
to the warrant requirement, and maintain the state's burden to persuade that 
one of the exceptions applies. "sa 
If it is the court's view that neither constitution nor statute requires an 
arrest warrant, have the long-standing statutory exceptions been rendered 
superfluous?S9 It may be that notwithstanding the court's position that the 
Texas Constitution is not a source for the warrant preference, there 
nevertheless exists a well-established common law preference that gives 
meaning to the exceptions.60 Indeed there is considerable authority, both in 
case law and among commentators, to that effect.61 
56. See Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n.l (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). The Honeycult 
court explained: 
An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective 
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of 
an after-the-eventjustification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the 
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment. . .. If subjective good faith alone were the test, 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ·secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects: only in the discretion of the police. 
Id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,96-97 (1964»; see Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 861 ("The 
overriding principle behind the courts' approach is that an arrest made without warrant threatens the 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and arrests . "). 
57. Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 861. 
58. Id. Among the most important of these is the avoidance of having judicial review only after 
an arrest has been made and, perhaps, incriminating evidence has been discovered. See id. The trial judge 
conducting this review knows that the consequences of a finding of no probable cause may include the 
factually guilty going free, the arresting officer being disciplined, prosecuted, or held civilly liable for 
damages, or all of these. See id. It is hardly an atmosphere conducive to detached, neutral decision 
making. See id. 
59. See Hulit v. Texas, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
60 . Cj DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 7.50 (showing that the Hulit court decided ·[wJithout 
carefully examining the possibility that Texas tradition had accepted a warrant requirement at least for 
arrests."). 
61. It must be noted that virtually none of this authority specifies Article I, Section 9, or for that 
matter, the Fourth Amendment as the source of the preference. See, e.g., Randall v. Texas, 656 S.W.2d 
487, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hogan v. Texas, 631 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Hardison 
v. Texas, 597 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Honeycult, 499 S.W.2d at 663-64; Giacona v. 
Texas, 298 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957), cwerruled on other grounds by Tumlin v. Texas, 351 
S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961); Deleon v. Texas, 201 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947); 
Heath v. Boyd, 175 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. 1943); Lacy v. Texas, 7 Tex. App. 403 (1879); 1 TEXAS 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE GUIDE § 10.03(1) (Matthew Bender & Co., ed., 1999) (discussing how "Any arrest 
of a person without a warrant is deemed to be an unreasonable seizure unless it is specifically authorized 
by statute."); 22 TEx. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 2004 (1982) (stating "[TJhe right to arrest without warrant 
is conferred only by statute"); ROBERT O. DAWSON & GEORGE E. D1X, TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
3.02 (1984) (discussing that a warrantless arrest is valid only if brought within one or more of statutory 
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While Hulit seems for the moment to have settled the question of 
whether the Texas Constitution is the source for the warrant preference, it is 
premature to conclude that the preference has been abandoned, or that it 
should be. The court would assume a super-legislative role if it were to hold 
that no arrest warrant preference exists even in Texas's common law. By 
adopting and maintaining the warrant exceptions in chapter 14 and article 
18.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as an implied 
limitation on warrantless arrests in article 2.13, the Texas Legislature has 
declared its belief that exceptions are required.62 For the court to hold 
otherwise is to render the Legislature's aci.:i meaningless, and concurrently to 
reverse the court's own firmly rooted and often-reiterated position that 
warrants are essentia1.63 
Abandonment of Texas's strong preference for warrants also would 
plunge the law of the state into the very kind of uncertainty Judge Womack 
cited in Hulit as reason for eschewing the United States Supreme Court's 
approach to the Fourth Amendment.64 In a twinkling, Texas trial judges and 
peace officers would be left without meaningful guidance, trying to guess 
whether a particular arrest, made with or without a warrant, is "reasonable. "6S 
Hulil itself illustrates the danger in this approach. The court of criminal 
appeals refused to consider whether a "community care-taking exception" 
authorizations); DAVID M. HORTON & RYAN KELLUS TURNER, loNE STAR JUSTICE 171 (1999) 
(demonstrating, generally, that a warrantless arrest is unreasonable unless statutory warrant exception 
exists); BARTON, supra note 8, § 1.021 (explaining that Texas warrantless arrest authority governed 
exclusively by statute; warrantless arrest deemed unreasonable and unlawful in absence of authorizing 
statute); DIX& DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.1 I (showing that Texas statutory law imposes an arrest warrant 
requirement); REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 9, at 20-21 (justifYing that warrantless arrests in Texas must 
be made by "explicit statutory authority"); Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 860-61 (showing that 
arrests in Texas must be by warrant unless one of limited statutory exce\.ltions to warrant requirement 
applies). The judges and authors merely state the rule with the sweep and confidence one would accord 
any principle about which there is no longer serious debate. See Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 860-
61. The Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion in Hulit completely ignored this body oflaw. See generally 
Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 436-38 (noting the court's failure to rely on precedence). 
62. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 2.13, 14.01-.06, 18.16 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000). 
Article 2.13 describes the duties of a peace officer, including that the officer shall "arrest offenders without 
warrant in every case where the officer is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the 
proper magistrate or court and be tried." Id. art. 2.13. Were there no general arrest warrant requirement, 
it would be odd to limit arrests without warrant to those cases "authorized by law." Id. That phrase might 
mean only that warrantless arrests must satisfY constitutional standards, but that usage seems superfluous. 
However, it makes complete sense as an acknowledgment that in Texas there often will be cases in which 
a warrantless arrest is not authorized by law. The Texas Legislature amended article 14.03(g) of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure in 1999, well after the Hulil decision. See Act of May 24, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., 
ch. 210, § 2, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 686-87. Had the Legislature believed that no warrant is required for 
an arrest in Texas, it surely would not have bothered to maintain provisions like article 14.03(g) providing 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
63 . See Hulil, 982 S.W.2d at 441-42 (Price, J., concurring). 
64. Id. at 436 (stating that "By finding a general requirement of a warrant to which there are 
exceptions, the Supreme Court has created ajurisprudential mare's nest"). 
65 . See id. 
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exists and held, without the slightest attempt at explanation, that the officers' 
actions were reasonable under Article I, Section 9.66 That pronouncement 
provided no way for even the most careful officer or judge to discern whether 
the next, similar but slightly different, arrest or detention would be reasonable, 
toO.67 
Acknowledging and preserving the traditional analytical construct keeps 
intact and available the accumulated reasoning and education that participants 
in the criminal justice system use to make important decisions, and often on 
the spur of the moment.68 As attractive as the tabula rasa may be to a court 
frustrated by seemingly insoluble interpretive problems, it is hard to imagine 
that wiping away decades of case law development will result in an improved 
condition.69 
VI. STATUTES AUTHORIZING A WARRANTLESS ARREST 
Texas's statutory arrest warrant exceptions "are founded in the law of 
necessity, that is, the necessity for prompt action in order to arrest or detain 
the offender so as to prevent his escape."70 While exigency clearly forms the 
basis for some of the exception statutes, its application to others is less 
obvious.71 What properly ties together these relatively few exceptions is the 
potential loss of important interests-primarily personal security and property 
interests-that could result from the delay necessary to acquire prior judicial 
authorization for an arrest.72 
The most important exceptions are found in chapter 14 of the Texas Code 
of Criminal Procedure, and in article 18.16 of the same code.73 Of these, the 
66. Jd. at 438. 
67. See Reamey, supra note 13, at 66-67 (arguing that basing decisions on reasonableness fails 
to provide guidance for those most affected). 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 65. The use of reasonableness as the sole measure of constitutionality potentially 
can result in more nuanced and persuasive court decisions. 
Jd. 
Unfortunately, for all of the benefits to be gained by sophisticated, narrowly focused 
adjudication, the method also contains the potential to do great harm. Used unwisely or 
inexpertly, or with bad motive, the search for reasonableness can undermine public confidence 
in decision making; obscure, ignore, or chip away at sound principles; and promote 
unprincipled activism. 
70. Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (quoting 6 TEx. JUR. 
2d Arrest § 12 (1959». 
71. Compare TEX. CODE CRlM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977) (concerning a felony 
offender about to escape), with TEx. CoDE CRJM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.0 I (b) (Vernon I 977)(concerning any 
offense committed in presence or view of peace officer). 
72. See Reamey, supra note 13, at 65 . 
73. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01-.04, 18.16. In this context, "important" Signifies 
those most often relied upon by officers, prosecutors, and courts to justify warrantless arrests. See id. For 
summaries of these provisions, see Dlx & DAWSON, supra note 7, at Ch. 9, subch. B and Reamey & 
Harkins, supra note 8, at 863-73. 
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exception undoubtedly used more often than any other is for offenses 
committed in the "presence or ... view" of the arresting officer.74 Peace 
officers may arrest under this exception for "any offense," and "any other 
person" may arrest for a felony offense or an offense against the public 
peace.75 The underlying assumption for this statute seems to be that a person 
offending in the presence or view of an officer is either a flight risk, or is 
particularly dangerous, or both. Delaying the arrest in such cases could be 
justified by a kind of exigency, although it is an exigency that is less 
obviously present than in some of the other exception cases.76 
A similar provision is made for felonies and offenses against the public 
peace "committed in the presence or within the view of a magistrate.'077 The 
magistrate is authorized, in such cases, to "verbally order[ ] the arrest of the 
offender. ,,78 This occasionally may occur to quell a disturbance in a 
courtroom, but it is not an important provision in the law of warrantless arrest. 
Article 14.03, which began rather simply as that short statute from pre-
Civil War days, has expanded to include a number of entirely dissimilar 
exceptions of recent vintage.79 Several of these, added to the section in 
piecemeal fashion, are based on reforms in domestic violence legislation.8o 
They permit, and sometimes require, officers to arrest without warrant persons 
who have assaulted household members or violated the terms of a protective 
order.8! Other provisions deal with the vexing problem of territorial 
jurisdiction and the authority of peace officers to arrest "away from home."82 
Chapter 14 also contains an article allowing officers to arrest persons 
who are "about to escape" after committing a felony offense.8) Article 14.04 
74. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01. 
75 . [d. art. 14.01(b). ·Peace officer" is also statutorily defined. See id. arts. 2.12, 14.0 I (a),(b). 
Article 14.01 is the so-called "citizen's arrest" provision that allows "any perion" to arrest without warrant 
for relatively serious offenses. [d. art. 14.01; see Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 863-65. An 
interesting example of the interplay between "citizen's arrest" and the territorial arrest jurisdiction 
limitations on peace officers is Ramo v. Texas, a case in which a peace officer outside his territorial 
jurisdiction arrested a driver for OWl. 577 S.W.2d 251, 252-53. (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The arrest was 
upheld, not because the officer was a peace officer, but because "any person" could have arrested for the 
offense under article 14.01(a). See id. at 253. Offenses "against the public peace" are not well-defined. 
See Woods v. Texas, 213 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948). 
76. See. e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (concerning a felony offender about to 
escape). 
77. [d. art. 14.02. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. art. 14.03. 
80. See id. art. 14.03(aX2)-(4),(b),(c). 
81. See id. art. 14.03(a)(2)-(4),(b). 
82. See id. art. 14.03(d), (g); BARTON, supra note 8, § 1.0136; Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, 
at 857. 
83. See TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04. This provision is expressly limited to felonies, 
a fact that rather strongly illustrates the legislature's reluctance to authorize warrantless arrests more 
generally. See generally id. (noting the various requirements for a warrantless arrest). Indeed, it 
persuasively argues against reading Texas law as not including a preference, or requirement, for warrants. 
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does not use the words "probable cause," but its requirement of "satisfactory 
proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a 
felony has been committed" has been interpreted as the equivalent of probable 
cause." Finally, and maybe most confusingly, the statute expressly refers to 
there being "no time to procure a warrant. "IS This temporal exigency language 
led the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Fry v. Texas at first to hold that 
the requirement is an essential element to be proved by the State, but then on 
rehearing to decide that police need only have a representation from the 
"credible person" that circumstances exist which preclude the luxury of a 
warrant.16 This resolution has not been entirely satisfactory, even to the 
courts. 17 
The principal exception outside chapter 14 deals exclusively with theft.ss 
Like article 14.01(a), article 18.16 creates a limited citizen's arrest 
possibility.s9 "All persons" having a "reasonable ground" are permitted to 
seize property believed to be stolen, and to take it, along with the "supposed 
offender," before a magistrate.90 The supposed offender also may be turned 
over to a peace officer.91 
VII. ARTICLE 14.03(a)(1): THE "SUSPICIOUS PLACES" EXCEPTION 
As recently as 1965, article 14.03 in its entirety read: 
The municipal authorities of towns and cities may establish rules 
authorizing the arrest, without warrant, of persons found in suspicious places, 
and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been 
guilty of some felony or breach of the peace, or threaten, or are about to 
commit some offense against the laws.92 
This language originated in the penal code of 1856, and most of it survives in 
See id.; see also Fry v. Texas, 639 S.W.2d 463 (rex. Crim. App. 1982) (stating the elements of the 
exception); DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, §§ 9.22-.23. 
84. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04. None of these traditional exceptions uses the words 
probable cause, but all require, in differing language, that sufficient suspicion exist. See id. art. 
14.03(a)(I) ("circumstances which reasonably show"); art. 14.04 ("satisfactory proof"); art. 18.16 
("reasonable ground to suppose"); Earley v. Texas, 635 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). 
85. TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04. 
86. 639 S.W.2d at 476. 
87. See Dejarnette v. Texas, 732 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); DlX&DAWSON, supra 
note 7, § 9.23. 
88. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.16 (preventing consequences of theft); D1X & 
DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.31. 
89. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.16. 
90. [d. 
91. See id. 
92. Act ofJan. I, 1966, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317, 362 (amended 1999) 
(current version at TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 2000». 
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the current version of the statute.93 Texas's legislative history is remarkably 
sparse, and for a provision more than 140 years old, only speculation based 
on text and context can shed light on its original purpose.94 
Professors Robert Dawson and George Dix believe that the statute "most 
likely was viewed as delegating to local authorities the power to provide by 
ordinance for law enforcement officers to preventively intervene when they 
encountered suspicious persons. "95 This guess may be correct, but it seems by 
contemporary standards to be a rather indirect way of providing for preventive 
detention.96 Nevertheless, the reference to "municipal authorities ... 
'establish[ing] rules' authorizing 'the arrest ... of persons found in suspicious 
places' " might have been intended to encourage the creation by local 
governments of minor substantive offenses designed to curb loitering and 
other suspicious behavior.97 
Alternatively, the rules that municipal authorities were invited by the 
legislature to establish could have been intended to be strictly procedural.98 
"Authorizing the arrest, without warrant," modifies "rules" in the original 
statute, connoting perhaps that these municipal rules should authorize 
warrantless arrests rather than create substantive offenses for suspicious 
activity.99 Either view is problematic at the end of the twentieth century. 
If the legislature meant to urge cities to enact suspicious persons or 
loitering ordinances, these would be seen today as almost surely 
unconstitutional. loo On the other hand, if the statute was intended to promote 
adoption of procedural ordinances authorizing warrantless arrests, it is even 
less clear why such rule making would be delegated to the lowest level of 
government. 101 It is especially important that this kind of arrest procedure rule 
be consistent throughout the state, and there is no special virtue in consulting 
varying community standards in the legislative consideration of such rules. I02 
It is not far-fetched to think that in the 1850s, or for that matter in the 
1950s, the Texas Legislature might pass a law encouraging cities to punish 
93. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.28. 
94. See id. 
95 . Id. 
96. See id. 
97. Id. Professors Dawson and Dix seem to agree that the original motivation for the statute may 
have been more substantive than the current version would suggest. See id. 
98. See TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN art. 14.03 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000). 
99. Id. 
100. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.28 (showing that ordinances authorized by statute 
"today would certainly be regarded as constitutionally offensive"); see also Howard v. Texas, 617 S.W.2d 
191,192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding suspicious persons ordinance to be flagrantly unconstitutional 
for vagueness). 
101. See generally DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.28 (discussing the "suspicious place" 
requirement). 
102. See generally id. § 9.28-.30 (discussing the ·suspicious place" requirement). 
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loitering, lurking, congregating, vagrancy, or other suspicious behavior. 103 As 
recently as 1979, an Austin city ordinance provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person within the city to be in the nighttime 
in or about public or private buildings or premises, where he has no right or 
permission to be, under suspicious circumstances, and without being able to 
give a satisfactory account of the same.lD4 
An earlier, but virtually identical, version of the ordinance was challenged by 
a defendant in Sims v. Texas. los The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the 
defendant's contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional as an 
unreasonable restraint on personal liberty and upheld his loitering 
conviction. 106 
Fourteen years later, the court heard another challenge to the same 
ordinance. 107 In Howard v. Texas the defendant, along with two female 
companions, was found after dark lying in some leaves behind a hardware 
store. lOB Responding to a police officer's question, the defendant said he was 
just drinking beer, and admitted that he had been arrested previously for 
burglary.l09 The officer arrested the three suspects for violating Austin's city 
ordinance, and in a search incident to arrest found marijuana in the 
defendant's sock. I 10 
The court focused this time on the appellant's contention that the 
ordinance was constitutionally deficient for permitting conviction of persons 
found in suspicious circumstances" 'without being able to give a satisfactory 
account of the same.' "I" Finding that "such a standard delegates unguided 
and unrestrained discretion to the arresting officer to decide what answers 
given by a potential arrestee are 'satisfactory account[s]' and which are not," 
the majority found that the ordinance "exhibits a vagueness obvious to 'any 
person of reasonable prudence.' "112 
103. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999) (holding unconstitutional the latest 
iteration ofloitering statutes, an ordinance aimed at congregation by gang members). Vagrancy laws were 
the favored way to authorize police to deal with ·undesirables" until the Supreme Court struck down such 
an ordinance in 1972 as void for vagueness. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 
(1972). Soon after, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied this reasoning to hold a Lubbock, Texas, 
vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional. See Baker v. Texas, 478 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). 
104. Howard, 617 S.W.2d at 192 (quoting Austin City Ordinance 23-9). 
105. 391 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965). 
106. See id. at 64-65. 
107. See Howard, 617 S.W.2d at 192. 
108. See id. at 191. 
109. See id. at 191-92. 
110. See id. at 192. 
Ill. Id. (quoting Sims v. Texas, 391 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965». 
112. Id. (alteration in original). On rehearing, the State conceded that the ordinance was "facially 
unconstitutional," but argued that it was not ·so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional" that the State 
should be deprived of the good faith rule of Michigan v. DeFillippo,443 U.S. 31 (1979), that an officer 
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With respect to the legislature's intent in passing the original version of 
article 14.03, two possibilities emerge from this brief review of the 
constitutionality of suspicious persons ordinances. One is that the statute 
could have been meant to facilitate the passage of such ordinances. lll The 
constitutional impediments that we virtually take for granted today would not 
have been apparent to the framers. So much is clear from the relatively recent 
lesson of Howard. 114 
It also is possible, as suggested previously, that the original statute was 
a delegation of arrest procedure rule making rather than an invitation to create 
new local offenses, or that it was a combination of the twO.1I5 There is some 
historical support for this view in the action of the 1967 Texas Legislature. 116 
In that year, article 14.03 was amended on recommendation of the State Bar's 
Committee on Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Texas 
Attorney General, and the Texas Police Association. 1I7 The change was 
described in a report by the Committee as follows: 
The Committee further recommends that Article 14.03 be amended so 
as to extend to all peace officers the right to arrest without warrant persons 
found in suspicious places under circumstances where probable cause exists 
to show such person has committed or is about to commit an offense. This 
is a right which the statute presently extends only to city officers upon 
passage of appropriate city ordinances. III . 
If the authors of this passage were knowledgeable about the meaning of the 
original statute-and there is no reason to believe they were not-the last 
ordinarily may rely on the presumed constitutionality of statutes. [d. at 192-93. Relying exclusively on 
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Texas exclusionary rule, the court denied the motion 
for rehearing and insulated its decision from review by the Supreme Court. See id. at 193-94. 
113 . See id. 
114. See id. Texas is not the only place in which the constitutional deficiencies of loitering or 
suspicious persons ordinances are either unknown or ignored. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 54 (1999) (holding a loitering ordinance unconstitutional). Some lawmakers apparently cannot 
resist the temptation to combat the problem of ·undesirable" people in suspicious places by passing 
sweeping prohibitions giving law enforcement officers unfettered discretion. See·id. 
115. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. Whatever the original purpose, the resulting 
statute bears language that could lead the superficial reader to believe it either authorizes suspicious 
persons ordinances, or that it actually recognizes that suspicious behavior is an offense. See TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2000). However, as noted elsewhere, 
While 'suspicious circumstances' may help establish probable cause to arrest for some offense 
or justifY a temporary investigative detention, or in Texas may provide grounds for arresting 
without a warrant, a person found in such circumstances is not, by that fact alone, guilty of an 
offense and subject to arrest. 
REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 9, at 30. 
116. See W. A. Morrison & Jim D. Bowmer, Recommended Changes Code o/Criminal Procedure, 
29 TEx. B.1. 1003, 1054 (1966). 
117. See id. 
118. Jd. 
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quoted sentence, while somewhat ambiguous, supports the view that the 
earlier version was a limitation on warrantless arrest jurisdiction applicable 
statewide. 119 However, there remained room to argue that the proposed 
change was seen as a way to extend to all peace officers the right to make 
warrantless arrests of persons in suspicious circumstances, presumably 
because some statewide suspicious persons law would supersede local 
ordinances. 120 
After passage of the amendment, Judge John Onion, Jr.-then a sitting 
judge on the court of criminal appeals, and later the author of some of the 
most significant decisions interpreting article 14.03-described the change in 
this way: 
Article 14.03 (1967) withdraws the authority of cities and towns to 
establish "suspicious persons ordinances," and in lieu thereof, makes the 
arrest of persons in suspicious circumstances part of our state law .... The 
effect of this amendment will allow courts to take judicial knowledge of such 
"suspicious persons" law, and will alleviate the necessity of proving up the 
city ordinance to show a valid arrest. 121 
Clearly, Judge Onion viewed the original statute as creating a right of cities 
to pass loitering or suspicious persons ordinances, a right he believed the 
amendment withdrew from cities and established as "part of our state law."122 
One reasonably might interpret his language as recognition that existing state 
law included a substantive component, joined by the amendment with a 
statewide warrantless arrest authorization. 123 If so, this confusion of 
substantive and procedural aspects in article 14.03 was not unique to Judge 
Onion, and it continues to infect the interpretive efforts of modem Texas 
courts. 124 
The actual 1967 amendment to article 14.03 substituted "[a]ny peace 
officer may arrest" for "[t]he municipal authorities of towns and cities may 
establish rules authorizing the arrest."12S In its newer incarnation, the 
119. See id. 
120. See id. 
121 . Judge John F. Onion, Jr. & Warren E. White, Texas Code o/Criminal Procedure-lts /965 & 
/967 Changes Affecting Corporation Courts and Police Practices, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 92, 97-98 (1968). 
122. [d. At least some cities passed such ordinances, and the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld 
arrests and searches pursuant to them. See Laube v. Texas 417 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); 
Chamblerv. Texas, 416 S.W.2d 826, 828 (rex. Crim. App. 1967); Saldana v. Texas, 383 S.w.2d 599, 600 
(rex. Crim. App. 1964). 
123. There does not seem to be any such statewide suspicious persons statute, either in the Penal 
Code or elsewhere. If one existed, it almost certainly would fall prey to the same kind of constitutional 
attack that succeeded in Howard. Howard v. Texas, 617 S.W.2d 191 , 192-93 (rex. Crim. App. 1979). 
124. See Onion & White, supra note 121, at 97-98. 
125. Compare Act of Aug. 28, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 659, § 9, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1735, with 
Act of Jan. 1,1966, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317,362 (authorizing more direct 
action by police). 
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placement of the statute in chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure, "Arrest Without Warrant," seems entirely appropriate, 
notwithstanding the vestiges of language that might support a more 
substantive reading of the provision. 126 Whether Texas ever attempts to enact 
a statewide loitering or suspicious persons statute, or not, the language of the 
current version of article 14.03 does not support viewing it as creating by 
itself a substantive offense. 127 
Article 14.03(a)(I) was amended most recently in 1993 to include, in 
addition to felonies and breaches of the peace, authorization to arrest, without 
warrant, persons violating title 9, chapter 42, of the Penal Code or section 
49.02 of the Penal Code. 12K Title 9 of chapter 42 deals with "offenses against 
public order and decency," and includes such offenses as disorderly conduct, 
riot, harassment, cruelty to animals, and obstructing a highway or other 
passageway.129 In addition, section 49.02 prohibits public intoxication yo 
These offenses seem to share the character of crimes "against the public 
peace," and it may be that the legislature named them within article 
14.03(a)(I) merely to make clear that they belong within that category. 
However, it is not this most recent modification of the statute that has caused 
problems for Texas courtS. 131 
VIII. THE STRUGGLE TO ApPLY AN OLD STATUTE IN A NEW WORLD 
A quick, impressionistic reading of article 14.03(aX I) reveals the root of 
the interpretive difficulty. 132 The statute hints: (l) that it creates, or at least 
recognizes, a suspicious persons offense; (2) that it authorizes a custodial 
warrantless arrest for suspicious behavior; (3) that it permits a temporary, 
investigative detention for crimes about to be committed; and/or (4) that it 
excuses a warrant for whatever kind of arrest law enforcement officers make 
in suspicious places. 133 None of these explanations is entirely satisfactory. 
For each, there remain questions that simply cannot be answered by the 
inherently inconsistent text. 
The most significant early attempt to reconcile these contradictions is the 
court of criminal appeals' decision in Lara v. Texas, a case that amply 
126. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon 1977 and Supp. 2000) (noting 
the language of the 1999 amended version). 
127. See id. art. 14.03(a)(I); REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 9, at 30 (arguing that a person found 
in suspicious circumstances "is not, by that fact alone, guilty of an offense"). 
128. See Act of Sept. I, 1994, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 3.06, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3715, 3715-
16. 
129. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.02, 42.07, 42.09, 42.03 (Vernon 1994). 
130. See id. § 49.02. 
131. See infra Part VIII. 
132. See generally TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (describing 
four types of persons a peace officer may arrest without a warrant). 
133. See id. 
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illustrates, and helps explain, why no coherent understanding of article 
14.03(a)(l) has been achieved to date.134 On a November afternoon in 1968, 
Officer P. R. Gonzales, an experienced police detective patrolling in a 
"location known to him as frequented by dope addicts," spotted a car parked 
with its motor running.135 As Officer Gonzales watched, he saw "a suspicious 
person there coming from the area of some vacant shacks."136 
Officer Gonzales contacted the man who had emerged from the shacks 
and requested identification.137 After this exchange, the officer "noticed some 
suspicious persons" a short distance away, and he called for assistance. 138 
When his backup, Officer Teran, arrived, the pair approached the shacks, "a 
'lookout' yelled something," and "five or six persons [emerged,] running in 
different directions."139 
Officer Teran chased and caught Isaias Lara and handcuffed him to a 
stop sign. 140 A quick search of Lara uncovered a pocket knife; then Officer 
Teran chased and caught other "subjects" who also were searched. 141 Without 
further explanation, the court of criminal appeals noted that, "[t]he heroin 
heretofore referred to was found on appellant. Officer Teran also testified 
that, in his opinion, appellant was under the influence of narcotics."142 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Teran testified that the vacant shacks 
were known to be a place used by "dope addicts"; that the officers previously 
had made calls at the location; and that they "had received information from 
other people, reliable people that they had seen lot [sic] of subjects, dope 
addicts going to that location and into the shacks."143 He also testified that he 
had made other arrests at the location, and that he had seen evidence inside the 
shacks that they were being used by people taking heroin. 144 
The entire analysis of the arrest issue by the court was as follows: 
We hold that under all the circumstances herein observed by the 
officers and the facts known by them, they had probable cause to be 
suspicious and the arrest was authorized under Art. 14.03 Vernon's Ann. 
C.C.P .... 
The arrest made under the provisions of Art. 14.03, supra, would 
authorize a search of appellant's person incident thereto and the fruits thereof 
were admissible in evidence. Appellant's complaint of the second search at 
134. 469 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. See id. 
138. Id. 
139. /d. at 178·79. 
140. See id. at 179. 
141. See id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. 
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the scene is without merit. 14S 
No further explanation was offered for the finding that probable cause existed, 
or even for whether probable cause was required by a statute authorizing a 
warrantless seizure on "circumstances which reasonably show" guilt. 146 No 
attempt was made to decipher the opinion's curious finding that the officers 
had "probable cause to be suspicious."14' Most importantly, the court failed 
to specify exactly what crime the defendant had committed that led to his 
warrantless arrest. 148 
Due perhaps to the paucity of its own analysis or to its realization that its 
original summarization of the facts was misleading, the court granted 
rehearing in Lara and offered a startlingly different explanation for its 
affirmance.149 The court explained that Lara had been handcuffed to the stop 
sign, searched cursorily, then left alone while Officer Teran rounded up other 
suspects. 150 Eventually, the defendant and two other men were transported 
back to the shacks, given Miranda warnings, and searched. 151 It was then that 
the capsule of heroin "fell" from the defendant's clothing. ls2 
Apparently troubled by the interval between Lara's initial detention and 
"second" search, Judge Onion characterized the intervening time and distance 
as "short," and all "part of one continuous happening. "153 The more significant 
issue was the justification for the defendant's initial detention, an issue only 
confused by the court's inadequate and vague explication in its opinion on 
145. Id. (citations omitted). 
146. Id. (quoting the 1967 version of article 14.03). It would be hard to take seriously any claim 
that probable cause existed for the custodial arrest of Isaias Lara. See id. The opinion reflected no 
evidence known to either officer that Lara actually was involved in a crime. See generally id. at 178-79 
(noting the absence of any mention of probable cause). Only his flight from a "high-crime" area made him 
suspicious. See id. What was known to the officers might have amounted to reasonable suspicion at most, 
but fell woefully short of probable cause. This conclusion was reflected in the court's initial reliance on 
article 14.03 and the "suspicious circumstances" under which Lara was found, rather than on article 14.0 I, 
which would have authorized a warrantless arrest merely because Lara was committing a crime in the 
presence or view of the officer. See generally id. at 179 (noting the court's reliance on article 14.03). 
147. Id. 
148. See generally id. (noting the court's omission as to what crime the defendant had committed). 
149. See id. at 179-80 (opinion on reh'g). Judge Onion began the court's opinion on rehearing by 
explaining: 
On rehearing appellant contends we missed the point he sought to make on original 
submission. He points out, and correctly so, that the capsule of heroin was recovered as a result 
of the second search of his person. He contends that our original opinion left the impression 
it was recovered when he was first apprehended, and that the second search was not reasonable 
because it was not made contemporaneously with the arrest; that it was at another time and 
place. 
Id. at 179. 
150. See id. The court never used the word "frisk" to describe the cursory search. See id. 
151. See id. at 179-80. 
152. See id. at 180. 
153. Id. 
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original submission. lS4 Turning to that point, Judge Onion again cited article 
14.03 as justifying the arrest. ISS However, this time, he explained that because 
Lara had been under the influence of a narcotic drug, which was a felony 
offense, and because that offense occurred in the presence or view of the 
arresting officer, "[t]he subsequent search would not necessarily be tied to 
Article 14.03, supra, but rather to the violation later discovered."156 He 
concluded: "Thus another reason appears to justify the second or subsequent 
search. "157 
If Judge Onion sought to clarify the application of article 14.03 to the 
facts of Lara, he did not succeed. The upshot of the court's opinion on 
rehearing was that, for reasons never examined in the decision, article 14.03 
mysteriously justified the initial seizure and detention of Lara, and that, once 
he was "lawfully" detained arid seen to be under the influence of heroin, he 
could be arrested under authority of article 14.0 I, and searched incident to that 
custodial arrest. us 
The implications of the opinions in Lara were as stunning as they were 
baffling. Was the court saying that article 14.03, independent of any 
substantive offense, created a right to arrest persons found in suspicious 
places? Is that what "probable cause to be suspicious" meant? If article 14.03 
could be used to justify Lara's "arrest" and handcuffmg, then why did not that 
statute authorize a search incident to arrest? Why was it necessary to rely on 
article 14.01? Recall that Judge Onion, the author of the court's opinion on 
rehearing, previously had expressed his view that the 1967 amendment of 
article 14.03 made "the arrest of persons in suspicious circumstances part of 
our state law."159 
Rather than making sense of this remnant of Texas's frontier law, the 
Lara court hopelessly muddled the meaning of article 14.03. 160 If it intended 
to apply article 14.03 as a kind of codified version of Terry v. Ohio, 
authorizing temporary investigative detentions on reasonable suspicion, the 
court failed by not reconciling the statute's use of the word "arrest" with the 
154. See id. 
ISS . See id. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. See id. 
159. Onion & White, mpra note 121, at 97·98. 
160. See Lara, 469 S.W.2d at 180. Describing the situation to law students more than a dozen years 
after the decision in Lara, Professors Dawson and Dix wrote: 
Perhaps the most troublesome of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is the apparent 
authorization in Article 14.03(a) for the ·arrest· of persons found in ·suspicious places· and 
·under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some 
felony or breach of the peace, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws 
....• It is sometirncs, however, invoked only to validate law enforcement conduct that might 
be regarded as an investigatory field detention rather than an arrest. 
DAWSON & DIX, supra note 61, § 3.02(0]. 
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Supreme Court's use of the term "detention."161 If, on the other hand, the 
court believed that article 14.03 sanctioned a full-blown custodial arrest under 
the facts of Lara, it was obliged to explain what facts constituted probable 
cause, and why, in its opinion on rehearing, it implicitly repudiated its original 
statement that an arrest under article 14.03 would authorize a search incident 
to arrest. 162 Instead, the court invoked article 14.01 to justify the continued 
detention and search of the suspect. 163 
Clearly, Lara is a transitional decision. The opinion on original 
submission reflects the view that the 1967 version of article 14.03 allowed a 
warrantless arrest of persons found in suspicious places; that is, it was a kind 
of statewide "suspicious persons ordinance."IM The opinion on rehearing, for 
the first time, reflects the court's discomfort in trying to explain how article 
14.03 could authorize an arrest when no statute independently created a crime 
for being in a suspicious place. l65 That discomfort was not well articulated in 
the opinion on rehearing, but it is palpable in the explanation that "oh, by the 
way," other statutory authority justified a warrantless arrest. l66 The result of 
161. 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968). An "arrest" is a "seizure" which must be based on probable cause. See 
generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (citing cases that are subject to the Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment requiring "probable cause"). As I will argue, the two terms "arrest" and 
"detention"-can be reconciled, and without anything like the tortuous reasoning reflected in Lora. 
Compare Lora, 469 S.W.2d at 180, with Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (discussing "arrest" requirements by article 
14.03 and ·seizure" requirements by the Fourth Amendment respectively). 
The court previously had discussed Terry and relied on its holding, but avoided in an obvious way 
a finding that article 14.03 was the statutory version of Terry. See Baity v. Texas, 455 S.W.2d 305, 308'()9 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970). 
162. The court previously had taken this position, also without explanation, in a case in which 
Dallas officers arrested a suspicious person under authority of a city ordinance passed pursuant to the 
predecessor to article 14.03. See Laube v. Texas, 417 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). In 
another case decided less than a year before Lora, the court relied exclusively on article 14.03 to support 
a search incident to arrest. See Baity, 455 S.W.2d at 309. Interestingly, the court cited Terry as authority 
for a temporary investigative detention, then introduced article 14.03 by writing, "[s1till further, attention 
is called to Article 14.03 .. . . " [d. at 307-09. No attempt was made to argue that article 14.03, rather than 
Terry, authorized the investigative detention. See id. 
163 . See Lora, 469 S.W.2d at 180 nn.I-2. 
164. This reading would have been consistent with the court's view, expressed in previous cases, 
that municipal suspicious persons ordinances were passed and applied pursuant to article 214 of the 1925 
Code of Criminal Procedure, the predecessor of article 14.03. See Laube, 417 S.W.2d at 290; Chambler 
v. Texas, 416 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). 
165. See Lora, 469 S.W.2d at 179. 
166. See id. at 180. Judge Onion's opinion demonstrates this analytical "shell game" in the 
following paragraph: 
We further observe that the officers made a bona fide arrest of the appellant under the 
provisions of Article 14.03, V.A.C.C.P. Thereupon they discovered he was under the influence 
of a narcotic drug, a felony. Under such circumstances Article 14.01, V.A.C.C.P. would come 
into play authorizing appellant's arrest for that offense and authorizing a search incident to that 
arrest. The subsequent search would not necessarily be tied to Article 14.03, supra, but rather 
to the violation later discovered. Thus another reason appears to justify the second or 
subsequent search. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
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this unexplained analysis was unsatisfactory in every respect. 
The opinions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interpreting article 
14.03 in the years following Lara did nothing to clarify whether the statute 
was procedural or substantive, nor did the Court come to tenns with the 
underlying constitutional issue. 167 The prosecution relied on article 14.03 in 
Rodriguez v. Texas to justify an officer's stop of a car leaving the parking lot 
of a closed business. 168 Based on no more than that, the court of criminal 
appeals upheld the warrantless arrest because the defendant "was trying to get 
away from the officers after they had seen him on a Sunday afternoon in a 
parking lot of a business establishment which was closed for the day."169 No 
mention was made of probable cause other than the court's acknowledgment 
that "the record does not reflect that the appellant was speeding.II\7O 
By contrast, in Hardinge v. Texas the court rejected article 14.03 as a 
justification for the warrantless arrest of a man loitering near a radio station 
and looking through a window in the building. 171 Citing Terry v. Ohio and 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the court held that the officer "simply did 
not have probable cause to arrest appellant at the time in question."172 The 
officers involved in the arrest testified that the defendant was "polite," that he 
was not committing a crime, and that there was no concern that he was going 
to commit one. 173 
Hardinge and Rodriguez illustrate the schizophrenic nature of the court's 
understanding of article 14.03 during this period. 174 In neither case was there 
probable cause to think the arrestee was committing a crime; both men were 
merely suspicious. 17s In one instance, the court upheld a warrantless arrest, 
and in the other the court ruled it illegal. 176 
A third post-Lara case was decided on an altogether different basis that 
foreshadowed many later cases. t77 Officers had probable cause to believe the 
defendant had committed a murder. l78 The officers obtained an arrest warrant 
and went to an apartment where they found and arrested the defendant. 179 
167. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text. 
168. 480 S.W.2d 631 , 631-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). 
169. Id. at 633. 
170. Id. 
171. 500 S.W.2d 870, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
172. Id. at 874 (citing Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156 (1972». 
173. See id. at 873. 
174. Compare Rodriguez, 480 S.W.2d at 632-33 (examining the warrantless arrest for possession 
of marijuana of persons found in suspicious places), with Hardinge, 500 S. W .2d at 872-73 (examining the 
discrepancies of the court's holdings regarding the issue of whether the officer had authority to arrest the 
defendant absent a warrant). 
175. See Hardinge, 500 S.W.2d at 873; Rodriguez, 480 S.W.2d at 633. 
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
177. See Lowery v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
178. See id. at 164. 
179. Seeid. atI61-62. 
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Subsequently, the court of criminal appeals held the warrant affidavit 
insufficient and analyzed the arrest as a warrantless arrest for which statutory 
authority was required.llo Finding that the apartment where the man was 
arrested was not a suspicious place, the court concluded that the warrantless 
arrest was unlawful. III 
Two distinct ways of looking at article 14.03 arrests emerge from these 
cases. 112 The approach represented by Rodriguez might be called 
"substantive."IS3 Despite the absence ofprobl:\ble cause, article 14.03 was used 
as authority for arrests, presumably on the unexpressed theory that it created 
a "suspicious persons" offense, or that such an offense existed in the common 
law of Texas. 1M The other, more procedural view, is represented by Lowery 
v. Texas, a case involving a murder arrest at the defendant's apartment.18~ 
Police had probable cause in Lowery but were prevented from effecting a 
valid warrantless arrest because the suspicious places requirement of article 
14.03 was not met. 186 The tum toward a procedural interpretation seen in 
Lowery sharply contrasted with the more traditional view illustrated by the 
opinion on original submission in Lara.IS7 
Viewing the statute as merely an exception to the arrest warrant 
requirement avoided two significant, and maybe even insurmountable, 
problems. First, article 14.03 was, and is, part of that chapter of the Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure entitled, "Arrest Without Warrant. "188 While 
headings and titles in the code have no substantive meaning, it would be 
awkward to maintain that a provision set among warrant exception statutes 
180. See id. at 163-64. 
18 1. See id. at 164-65. Lowery was not the first cast to take seriously the 'suspicious place" 
requirement. See Price v. Durdin, 207 S.W.2d 228, 229-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, no writ). 
182. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
183. Rodriguez, 480 S.W.2d at 633. This use oftht provision was not unique. See Hamel v. Texas, 
582 S.W.2d 424, 426-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). In his concurring opinion in Hamel, Judge W.C. Davis 
expanded on the majority 's use of article 14.03, arguing that the statute permitted both an investigative 
detention of the defendant and his arrest. [d. at 428-29 (Davis, 1., concurring). 
The court struggled with the illogic of this approach, though. Recall that in Hardinge, the absence 
of probable cause rendered the arrest illegal, even though the defendant acted suspiciously and might have 
been seen as being in a 'suspicious place" when he was approached by the police. Hardinge v. Texas, 500 
S.W.2d 870, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). The Hamel Court ignored this contradiction. Hamel, 582 
S.W.2d at 427. 
184. Rodriguez, 480 S.W.2d at 633 . Common law crimes were codified in the penal code reform 
of 1973. See TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.03(a) (Vernon 1994). At least after 1974, courts had no basis for 
concluding that there existed a (commonlaw), statewide 'suspicious persons' offense, even if those courts 
could have reconciled the constitutional problems inherent in such crimes. See id. 
185. 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
186. Jd. at 165. The court wrote: "[T]here is no way to conclude the officers arrested appellant in 
a suspicious place or under suspicious circumstances apart from their well founded belief that he had 
committed a serious crime." [d. at 164-65. 
187. Compare Lowery, 499 S.W.2d at 165 (illustrating the procedural interpretation of article 
14.03), with Lara v. Texas, 469 S.W.2d 177, 178-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (illustrating the traditional 
interpretation of article 14.03). 
188. See TEx. CODE CRIM. l'Roc. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon 1977 &. Supp. 2000). 
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was actually intended to create a suspicious persons offense for Texas. If that 
were the case, surely the offense would be located within the Penal Code, not 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, and would contain language defining the 
elements of the crime and establishing a range of punishment. 189 
The second problem is one of constitutional dimension. The United 
States Supreme Court in Michigan v. DeFillippo considered a Detroit 
ordinance authorizing officers with "reasonable cause" to stop a person whose 
"behavior warrants further investigation for criminal activity" and demand that 
the person identify himself.19O Although the court upheld the arrest in 
DeFillippo on the basis of good faith, it struck down the ordinance as being 
unconstitutionally vague. 191 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, citing 
DeFillippo, found the same constitutional infirmity in Austin's "suspicious 
persons ordinance," leaving no doubt that such ordinances almost always will 
be found unconstitutional. 192 Recently, the Supreme Court has added support 
to that premise. 193 
Alternatively, article 14.03 might be seen as a codification of Terry v. 
Ohio, thus justifying investigative detentions. 194 However, it is constitu-
tionally impermissible to view article 14.03 as statutory approval of an arrest 
for which no probable cause exists. 195 Consequently, the easier course for the 
court of criminal appeals was to abandon any attempt to use the article to 
approve custodial arrests based on either reasonable suspicion or a belief that 
a person was suspicious. Instead the court read the law as authority to arrest 
without warrant persons found in "suspicious places."I% 
189. As noted previously, Texas has no common law crimes. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.03(a) 
(Vernon 1994). 
190. 443 U.S. 31 , 33 (1979). 
191. Jd. at 40. 
192. See Howard v. Texas, 617 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
193. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 572 U.S. 41, 54 (1999) (holding as unconstitutional an . 
ordinance prohibiting loitering by gang members). 
194. See DAWSON & DIX, supra note 61, § 3.02[0]. "[Article 14.03] is sometimes, however, 
invoked only to validate law enforcement conduct that might be regarded as an investigatory field 
detention rather than an arrest." Jd. 
195. See Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 867 (illustrating that article 14.03 is "merely an 
exception to the warrant requirement; ... and cannot constitutionally be, an exception to the probable 
cause requirement"); see also Marc H. Folladori, Terry Revisited and the Law of Stop·and-Frisk in Texas, 
27 SW. LJ. 490, 494-95 (1973) (describing that the article 14.03 grant of authority to "arrest" on suspicion 
rather than probable cause violates the constitution). 
However, it is possible to read the statute as authority for a lesser detention, a Terry stop, requiring 
a lower level of suspicion than probable cause. See, e.g .. Reamey & Harkins, supra note 8, at 868. The 
textual problem raised by that approach is that the statute speaks of an arrest, a higher level of seizure 
requiring probable cause. See Id. Mixing these distinct levels of seizure creates added confusion in 
interpreting article 14.03. See. e.g., Wilson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 3, 4-5 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986) (finding 
of reasonable suspicion for ·stop and frisk" based in part on location being a "suspicious place" under 
article 14.03); Faulk v. Texas, 574 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (eschewing the use of 
" 'inarticulate hunch' " as sufficient for "investigatory stop" on grounds that it would constitute 
"manipulation of the probable cause doctrine"). 
196. "Reasonable suspicion" is that degree of suspicion to which the Supreme Court referred in 
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IX. PLACES THAT ARE "SUSPICIOUS" 
Defining suspicious place is sufficiently challenging in its own right. 197 
Article 14.03(aXl) provides no guidance to courts applying the term, and the 
confusing history of the statute is of no assistance. Early attempts by the 
courts of appeal mostly reflect an earnest effort to give meaning to this phrase 
at the statute's core. 198 The difficulty in doing so is captured by an often-
quoted passage in which the court of criminal appeals observed that "few, if 
any, places are suspicious in and ofthemselves."t99 
Carey v. Texas exemplifies a couri !:!king this point seriously without 
shedding much light on the suspicious place limitation.2°O The defendant first 
was contacted by police at the hospital where he had taken his fatally stabbed 
girlfriend.2ot Although Carey appeared unusually nervous, did not give a 
coherent explanation of the events, and appeared intoxicated, there was no 
probable cause to believe he had committed the offense.202 Nevertheless, 
Carey was detained at the hospital, taken to the police station, and eventually 
charged.203 
The court of appeals held that Carey effectively was arrested when he 
was placed in a police car at the hospital and transported to the police 
station.204 Because probable cause did not develop until the defendant gave 
inconsistent statements at the station, the arrest was unlawful, and it was not 
validated retroactively by the evidence developed later.205 Turning to the 
question of whether the hospital was a suspicious place, the court stated 
simply that "there is no characterization of the hospital as a suspicious 
Terry. 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). It is less than probable cause, and it supports a lesser intrusion-a 
temporary investigative detention-than that associated with custodial arrest. See id. The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals did continue to uphold investigative detentions based on reasonable suspicion, but not 
on authority of article 14.03 . See, e.g., Meeks v. Texas, 653 S.W.2d 6,12-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); 
Hamel v. Texas, 582 S.w.2d 424, 426-27 (Tex. Crim, App. 1979). Article 14.03 was used in those cases 
to justify the warrantless arrest of the suspect when a temporary detention resulted in the discovery of 
criminal evidence creating probable cause. See id. This usage has been noted by the court of criminal 
appeals: "In the past, Article 14.03(a) and its predecessor Article 14.03 have served as authorization for 
limited investigatory field detentions which occurred in a variety of places and as subsequent validation 
for warrantless arrests based upon probable cause." Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim, 
App. 1986). 
197. See D1X& DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30 (explaining that the substance of "suspicious place" 
is "remarkably obscure"). 
198. See discussion infra Part IX. 
199. Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421. 
200. 695 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ). 
201. See id. at 308-09. 
202. See id. at 311 . Carey was not sufficiently intoxicated to pose a danger to himself or others. 
See id. at 311-12. Consequently, he was not subject to an "on-view" arrest for public intoxication. See 
id. 
203. See id. at 309. 
204. See id. at 310-11. 
205. See id. at 312. 
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place. "206 
Carey is typical in its failure to define what constitutes a suspicious 
place. Evaluations of this most-important requirement share an "I know it 
when I see it" quality that impedes the thoughtful development essential to 
credible lawmaking.207 The lack of definition also permits courts to assert that 
a warrantless arrest is or is not permitted, virtually without limitation. 
The court of appeals in Thomas v. Texas at least explained which facts 
persuaded it that the public street on which the defendant was seen, along with 
two companions, carrying objects, constituted a suspicious place.2oa The 
explanation came in response to the appellant's contention, with which the 
court agreed, that" 'there is nothing inherently suspicious about members of 
a neighborhood walking down the street carrying something in broad 
daylight.' "209 The court noted that police had received a call from a neighbor 
who thought one of the men was carrying a television set, that the men put the 
items in a house known to be abandoned, and that at least one house in the 
neighborhood recently had been burglarized.210 These facts led the court to 
hold "that Appellant was in a suspicious place under circumstances which 
reasonably showed that he was guilty of some felony. "211 
Thomas provided more explanation than Carey of the meaning of 
suspicious place but, nevertheless, left questions unanswered: The court 
seemed to say that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant and his 
companions for theft or burglary at the time the suspects were seen on the 
street" 'toting something.' "212 However, at that moment, the police knew 
only that some men had placed property in a vacant house.213 There had been 
a burglary in the neighborhood recently, but there is no indication in the 
court's opinion that any evidence existed that the defendant was involved.214 
In short, and despite the court's finding that these circumstances "reasonably 
showed" the defendant had committed a felony, there was no apparent reason 
to believe that the property in his possession was stolen.21S Even ifthere was 
206. [d. 
207. Cf DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9 .30 (commenting that the court under.;tates the situation 
in its determination ofwhcther a place that is "suspicious" is "highly fact-specific" (quoting Holland v. 
Texas, 788 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ refd» . 
208. 681 S.W.2d 672, 674, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd). 
209. [d. at 676 (quoting Thomas's argument). 
210. See id. 
211. Jd. 
212. [d. at 674. The defendant ultimately was convicted of burglary ofa habitation. See id. at 673. 
The opinion focused on the time of the initial observation of the men rather than later, after they had been 
found by an officer and returned to the scene, the property had been located in the abandoned house, and 
identified by the owner whose home had been burglarized. See id. al 676. 
213. See id. a1674. The house originally was described as "vacant," then as "abandoned" in that 
portion of the opinion in which the court defended its position that the warrantless arresl was supported 
by article 14.03. See id. aI674-76. 
214. See generally id. (noting the opinion's failure to mention Thomas's link to the burglary). 
21 S. See id. a1676. 
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reason to believe that the property was stolen, there was insufficient proof that 
the television was of sufficient value to constitute a felony, or that it had been 
taken in a burglary.2I6 
Moreover, the officer located three men "in the neighborhood" matching 
the description he had been given by the neighbor who reported his 
suspicions.217 "The officer and the three men proceeded" to the neighbor's 
house and the search that uncovered the stolen property ensued.2IIi Nowhere 
in its opinion did the court pinpoint the moment of arrest, although doing so 
is critical in assessing whether the arrest occurred in a "suspicious place." If, 
as the court implied, the defendant was arrested "in the neighborhood" or on 
a public street, it is unclear why that was a suspicious place.219 
There is a real danger in this inability to define "suspicious place" that 
courts will misconstrue the statute to permit the custodial arrest of "suspicious 
persons;" that is, persons engaged in suspicious activity, regardless of the 
character of the place in which that activity occurs. If suspicious place has no 
meaning because it has virtually every meaning, the statute is transformed into 
a mandate to arrest anytime and anyplace probable cause exists. This 
interpretation potentially would result in a warrantless arrest authority broader 
than that permitted by the public place exception in Fourth Amendment 
law.220 
Douglas v. Texas illustrates how an expansive reading of suspicious 
place might have this effect.221 An Irving officer, responding to a call that 
shots had been fired in the vicinity of a certain address, arrived to be told by 
a citizen who pointed to a house across the street, " 'he is in there.' "222 The 
officer found a shooting victim lying in the front yard of the house.223 She and 
other officers then entered the house and located Douglas, whom the officers 
handcuffed while they investigated.224 
Police discovered that a witness had seen Douglas near the body, that he 
had put something in a parked car, and that he ran inside the house when he 
realized he had been seen by the witness.22S Douglas was formally arrested 
216. See id. 
217. Id. at674. 
218. See id. 
219. Id.; see generally id. at 672-77 (noting the opinion 's lack of mentioning where the arrest 
occurred). Actually, the appellant argued as if the arrest occurred when he was "walking down the street 
carrying something in broad daylight." Id. at 676. The court responded to that argument as if it agreed, 
but it was only later, after the men had been located "in the neighborhood" by the officer that they could 
have been taken into custody. Id. at 674. 
220. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-24 (1976). 
221. 679 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ). 
222. Id. 
223. See id. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
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and taken to the city jail where he was searched.226 In his pocket, the arresting 
officer discovered a contact lens case containing methamphetamine for which 
Douglas was charged.227 
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Douglas's warrantless arrest 
in the house was valid pursuant to article 14.03.228 In a remarkably 
unenlightening "analysis," the court observed merely that someone had been 
shot; that "witnesses referred the investigating officers to Douglas" by saying 
" 'there he is' "; and that Douglas was the only person present on the 
premises.229 Therefore, the court concluded, "Douglas was found in a 
suspicious place and under circumstances which would reasonably show that 
such person had been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace."230 
The court's opinion said nothing about whether Douglas lived in the 
house or whether the police knew ifhe was the occupant.231 Supposing that 
Douglas did live there, surely the premises would not be a "suspicious place" 
as to him, or at least not a place inherently suspicious. The only characteristic 
of the premises that arguably could have made them suspicious was that a 
crime had occurred there.232 The mere presence of the suspect presumably 
could not imbue the premises with suspicion, because to hold thus would read 
the limitation of article 14.03 out of existence.233 
Support for the notion that every crime scene is a suspicious place, at 
least if the suspect is found there, also derives from the most significant case 
on this point, Johnson v. Texas.234 Jerry Johnson was a maintenance man at 
an apartment complex where a burglary and stabbing occurred.235 There was 
no sign of forced entry into the apartment where the victim lived, and a 
witness identified the assailant as a black man.236 A key ring, hammer, one 
black glove, and a black undershirt were found in the apartment, along with 
a bloody kitchen knife.237 
Johnson arrived at the apartment while police were conducting their 
226. See id. 
227. See id. at 791. Douglas did not shoot the victim, as it turned out. See id. 
228. See id. 
229. [d. 
230. [d. 
23\. See generally id. at 790·91 (noting the court's failure to mention where Douglas lived and 
whether the police knew of this fact) . 
232. See REAME;y & BUBANY, supra note 9, at 28 (questioning whether Douglas means that every 
crime scene is a ·suspicious place·). 
233. It is a mere tautology to say that places in which a suspected criminal are found are suspicious 
in a way that justifies a warrantless arrest. If the power to arrest without warrant is grounded in necessity, 
it cannot extend to every place in which a suspect is found. ·Suspicious place" is simply a redundancy if 
given this expansive meaning. 
234. 722 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30 (explaining 
that Johnson V. Texas is "perhaps the leading case" on ·suspicious place"). 
235. See Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 418·19. 
236. Seeid.at418. 
237. See id. at 419. 
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investigation.238 He told the officers that he worked at the complex, and that 
he had been advised by the apartment answering service to go to the 
apartment when he had called them earlier in the morning.239 Officers thought 
Johnson appeared 'nervous, and they considered it odd for him to show up at 
the apartment because two security guards already were on the scene.240 
The physical evidence led police to suspect that the perpetrator was an 
employee of the complex.241 When they noticed blood on Johnson's pants, 
and then when he admitted that the keys found in the apartment belonged to 
him, Johnson was handcuffed, taken to the station, and questioned.242 After 
being charged with murder, Johnson moved to suppress evidence seized from 
him, claiming that he was arrested at the scene without a warrant, and that the 
warrantless arrest was not subject to any of the statutory warrant ex~eptions.243 
The court of criminal appeals began its review of denial of Johnson's 
suppression motions by determining that he had been arrested when he was 
handcuffed at the apartment complex.2-" That arrest, the court concluded, was 
supported by probable cause derived from the evidence known to the officers 
at the scene.24' Turning to the question of whether a warrant was required, the 
court cited article 14.03 and engaged in the most extensive discussion of the 
provision since Lara v, Texas.246 
Judge McCormick, writing for the majority, explained that the statute's 
command that "circumstances ... reasonably show" that the arrestee is guilty 
of an offense "is the functional equivalent of probable cause to believe that a 
particular person has committed a felony."247 Because probable cause existed 
for Johnson's arrest, the issue was whether it occurred in a suspicious place.248 
Facts known to an officer, together with reasonable inferences from those 
facts, might "arouse justifiable suspicion," but, according to the court, II 14.03 
should be applied to authorize warrantless arrests in only limited situations."249 
After reviewing the cases in which article 14.03 had been used to justify 
"limited investigatory field detentions" followed by arrests based on probable 
cause, Judge McCormick wrote, "We see no distinction between the detention 
cases and the situation at bar (where the officers' suspicions were justifiably 
aroused and probable cause to arrest arose contemporaneously) which would 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. 
243 . See Id. at 420. 
244. See id. at 419-20. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. at 421. 
247. ld. 
248. See id. 
249. Id. Judge McCormick noted in passing that "the obvious legislative intent of Chapter 14 [is 
the] protection of individual rights and furtherance ofiegitimate law enforcement.· Jd. 
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prevent the application of Article 14.03."250 Noting that "the presence of 
appellant was not contrived by law enforcement officials to circumvent the 
procurement of a warrant," the court concluded cryptically, "nor did 
appellant's arrest occur in a place where he could claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy."2sl 
As in Douglas, and even considering the court's iteration that article 
14.03 should be "applied to authorize warrantless arrests in only limited 
situations," the obvious inference is that a crime scene virtually always 
qualifies as a suspicious place.252 The Johnson court did not base its decision 
on exigency, and there was no indication that the suspect was about to flee.2S3 
Indeed, he voluntarily returned to the scene of the stabbing.2s4 The only 
plausible explanation for the court's holding that Johnson was arrested in a 
"suspicious place" is that he was found where the crime occurred.2SS 
To hold that every crime scene is suspicious essentially strips from 
article 14.03 the added protection afforded by Texas's statutory warrant 
exception scheme.2s6 The Fourth Amendment allows warrantless arrests on 
no more showing than probable cause and finding the suspect in a public 
place.257 If the crime scene is, perhaps like Douglas, the place where the 
suspected perpetrator lives or some other place that is not public, then the 
court's position leaves Texans with less "protection of individual rights" than 
they receive from the Fourth Amendment.258 What remained unclear after 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id.; Douglas v. Texas, 679 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ); see also 
DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30 (explaining that Johnson "involved an arrest at a crime scene"). In 
its descriptive recitation of eases applying article 14.03, the court characterized Douglas as holding "that 
a homicide crime scene was a suspicious place under the facts and circumstances available to the arresting 
officers and the warrantless arrest of the defendant was valid under Article 14.03(a)." Johnson, 722 
S. W .2d at 421 (emphasis added). 
253 . Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 420 (holding that exigent circumstances are found to be 
"constitutionally immaterial" to decision). 
254. See id. at 419. 
255. Id. In a similar, but significantly different case, a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals 
rejected the State's assertion that article 14.03 supported a warrantless arrest of a murder suspect from his 
room in the same apartment motel where the victim was living. See West v. Texas, 720 S.W.2d 511,512-
13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Judge W.C. Davis, writing for the plurality, concluded, "It would require a 
conscious distortion of the concept of 'suspicious places' to find the arrest of appellant in the motel 
apartment occupied by his companion to be authorized under [Article 14.03] ... .. Id. at 513. Apparently, 
the room from which the defendant was arrested was shared by a "companion" and the arrestee. See id. 
Inasmuch as he would have had a "reasonable expectation of privacy· in that room, the plurality may have 
been doing no more than expressing a strong preference for prior judicial approval of arrests from one's 
own apartment. Id. at 516-17. In any event, the fact that he was removed from the room where he was 
staying sufficiently distinguishes West from Johnson, even if one interprets ·crime scene" to include an 
apartment removed from the one in which the murder took place. Compare id., with Johnson, 722 S.W.2d 
. at 420-21 (discussing the limits of article 14.03). 
256. See West, 720 S.W.2d at 513-14. 
257. See U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 , 417 (1976). 
258. Johnson, 722 S. W.2d at 421 (holding that protection of individual rights is part of the ' obvious 
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Johnson was whether places other than crime scenes would be considered 
suspicious, and if so, on what basis. 
While the Johnson court expanded the scope of "suspicious places," the 
opinion simultaneously suggested several important limitations on article 
14.03: 
1. Article 14.03's requirement that circumstances "reasonably 
show" actually means that probable cause must exist;2S9 
2. "[L]imited investigatory field detentions" are authorized, 
perhaps by article 14.03, but "arrests" must be based on probable 
cause;260 
3. Contrivance by law enforcement officers to circumvent the 
warrant requirement might lead to a different result;261 and 
4. An arrest in a place in which the arrestee "could claim a 
reasonable expectation of privacy" may not be subject to article 
14.03.262 
However, all of these limitations created substantial interpretive problems for 
courtS.263 If article 14.03 authorizes "limited investigatory field detentions" 
and validates subsequent warrantless arrests based on probable cause, are the 
two kinds of detentions separable?264 On what basis did the court conclude 
that investigative detentions are part of a statute dealing with warrantless 
arrests?26S By what standard would contrivance by law enforcement officers 
be judged, and would a finding of contrivance invalidate a warrantless 
arrest?266 What did "reasonable expectation of privacy" have to do with 
whether a place is suspicious?267 These and other questions are raised by the 
legislative intent of Chapter 14"); Douglas v. Texas, 679 S.W.2d 790 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no 
writ) (discussing suspect arrested in house); cf West, 720 S.W.2d at 5\2-13 (plurality opinion) (holding 
that a warrantless arrest of suspect from companion's motel apartment would "require a conscious 
distortion of the concept of 'suspicious places ' "); REAMEY & BUBANY, supra note 9, at 28 n.3. 
259. 722 S.W.2d at 421 . "Circumstances within the knowledge of a peace officer which reasonably 
show that a particular person is guilty of a felony is the functional equivalent of probable cause to believe 
that a particular person has committed a felony ." [d. 
260. [d. (showing that article 14.03 has "served as authorization for limited investigatory field 
detentions which occurred in a variety of places and as subsequent validation for warrantless arrests based 
upon probable cause. "). 
261. See id. (stating that "[The] presence of appellant was not contrived by law enforcement 
officials to circumvent the procurement of a warrant"); DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9 .30 (commenting 
that the Johnson court suggested that contrivance would render warrantless arrest impermissible). 
262. Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421 ("[N]or did appellant's arrest occur in a place where he could 
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy"); see DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30. 
263. See Dlx & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
267. [d. If, for instance, police have probable cause to believe that a shop owner is in the process 
of setting fire to his store in order to defraud his insurance company, would they be able to arrest him 
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court's opinion in Johnson, but they are not answered.268 
In the years since Johnson was decided, the court of criminal appeals has 
had almost nothing more to say about "suspicious places."269 The court 
resorted to article 14.03(a)(1) to uphold the warrantless arrest in Muniz v. 
Texas, a 1993 case, but the court's analysis was no more, and arguably less, 
revealing than in previous cases.270 The evidence known to police provided 
probable cause to believe that the defendant, Pedro Muniz, raped and 
murdered his victim.271 Officers went to the defendant's brother's house to 
search for the suspect.272 Inside the house, the defendant's wife nodded 
toward a bedroom, and the "brother went directly to the closet in that room, 
opened the closet door, and motioned for [the defendant] to come out."m The 
defendant was arrested without a warrant.274 
The court's entire analysis consisted of a conclusion that the defendant 
was "hiding in the closet" and "that [the] appellant was arrested upon probable 
cause in a suspicious place, under circumstances that reasonably show he had 
committed some felony."27S Unlike Johnson, this arrest was not at the crime 
scene, and the court failed to explain why it considered the brother's house a 
suspicious place.276 Further, the court failed to explain why the arrestee had 
no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the house or closet.277 The premises 
had no apparent connection with the offense other than being where the 
suspect was hiding.278 If the court meant to imply that article 14.03(a)(1) 
permits a warrantless arrest in any place where the suspect is found, then 
Muniz eviscerated what little protection the statute afforded after the decision 
pursuant to article 14.03? Presumably, the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his store, yet 
it is a ·crime scene· and ·suspicious." See generally Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421 (stating that a crime 
scene is a suspicious place). Does a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place trump the statutory 
exception? 
268. Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 420-22. 
269. See Muniz v. Texas, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. I 993)(relying solely on ·probable 
cause" and article 14.03). 
270. [d. 
271. See id. 
272. See id. 
273 . [d. 
274. See id. 
275. [d. 
276. See id.; Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
277. Compare Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at251 (concluding that the suspect was arrested upon probable 
cause when found hiding in a suspicious place), with Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421 (suggesting that 
arrestee's reasonable expectation of privacy would disqualify premises for application of article 14.03); 
see also West v. Texas, 720 S.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Tex. Crim. App. I 986)(articulating that the apartment 
motel room rented to arrestee's companion and where arrestee was found were not ·suspicious places"). 
278. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 251 . The San Antonio Court of Appeals interpreted Muniz as being 
premised on the suspect's "behavior." See Texas v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264, 269 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 
1998, no pet.). Apparently the court of appeals believed, and perhaps correctly, that the court of criminal 
appeals viewed "hiding" in a closet as sufficiently suspicious behavior to render the premises on which it 
occurred a ·suspicious place" as well. See id. at 268-69. 
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in Johnson.279 Because the court of criminal appeals did not explain itself, it 
left the lower courts to continue to speculate, often in contradictory ways, 
about the meaning of suspicious place. 
The court of appeals' cases can be divided into three groups: those 
involving an arrest at the arrestee's residence; those occurring at a vehicle 
accident scene; and those in which a vehicle was the "suspicious place."28o In 
a few other cases, courts have left unanswered questions about whether a 
suspicious place was involved because an absence of probable cause for the 
arrest foreclosed the State's claim that it was justified by article 14.03(aXl).2Bl 
The cases in which the arrestees were found on their own property 
illustrate how dissimilar the approaches of the courts of appeals can be.282 In 
one case, the Dallas Court of Appeals found "no such clear indicia of 
suspicion" in the defendant's own apartment, the place where he was 
arrested.283 The court noted that no evidence of the crime being investigated 
(terroristic threat) was found in the defendant's apartment, and no stolen 
property or contraband was seen.284 The suspect "was agitated and smelled of 
alcohol, but neither of these constitute circumstances which would transform 
the site into a 'suspicious place.' "285 
The Houston Court of Appeals reached the opposite result in Crowley v. 
279. Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 251. Again, the court's holding in Muniz insinuates that, at least 
sometimes, Texans enjoy less protection from warrantless arrests by relying on statutory warrant 
exceptions than they would by invoking the scant protection of the Fourth Amendment. [d. If Muniz had 
argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest in his brother's house, he might have 
fared better than by relying on the illusory protections in chapter 14. See id. 
Muniz may be better understood as a court's reaction to a particularly brutal crime committed by a 
recidivist rapist. [d. In Muniz, probable cause existed, but the crime was not committed in the presence 
or view of the arresting officer, was not a theft, and there was no representation that the suspect might flee 
before a warrant could be procured. [d. at 250·51 . Given the brother's consent to enter his house and 
cooperation with the police, the court might have based its approval of the warrantless arrest on article 
14.04, the exception for persons who may flee, on the theory that they did not create the exigency that led 
to the discovery of the suspect, and that once discovered, he was bound to flee . See TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977). The fact that the subject was hiding in a closet reasonably would 
have supported such a conclusion and saved the court from its unfortun Ie choice of article 14.03(a)(I) 
to justifY the arrest. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 25 I. Ironically, the appellant argued on appeal that he was 
not "about to escape," but the court relied instead entirely on the ·suspicious place· exception. [d. at 250. 
280. Compare Parson, 988 S.W.2d at 266; Crowley v. Texas, 842 S.W.2d 701, 702·03 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); and Holland v. Texas, 788 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App.-Dallas 
1990, writrefd), wilh Cooper v. Texas, 961 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.J1997, writ 
ref d); Cornejo v. Texas, 917 S.W.2d 480, 482·83 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ refd); 
Flores v. Texas, 895 S.W.2d 435, 438·39 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ); Aitch v. Texas, 879 
S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ refd) and Segura v. Texas, 826 S.W.2d 178, 
180·81 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ ref d). 
281. See Rosalez v. Texas, 875 S.W.2d 70S, 719 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ refd); Mitchell v. 
Texas, 756 S.W.2d 71,74 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ). 
282. See Crowley, 842 S.W.2d at 701; Holland, 788 S.W.2d at 115. 
283. Holland, 788 S.W.2d at 115. 
284. See id. 
285. [d. 
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Texas.286 Instead of stopping at the scene of a traffic accident in which she 
had been involved, the defendant drove to her house, pulled into a detached 
garage, and closed the door.2B7 An officer called to the scene ordered the 
defendant to come out of the garage.288 She did so and subsequently was 
arrested for driving while intoxicated.289 
Unlike its sister court in Dallas, the Houston court concluded that article 
14.03(a)(1) authorized the warrantless arrest.290 Observing that the officer had 
ample reason to believe the suspect had committed the offense of failing to 
stop and give information and was still inside the detached garage, the court 
summarily held that it was "proper to classify the garage as a 'suspicious 
place.' "291 
The suspect in Texas v. Parson was found in his own front yard 
following a "hit and run" traffic accident.292 A citizen, who was not a witness 
to the accident, told police that the suspect admitted to having "struck 
'something' "while driving home.293 Officers followed the informant to the 
suspect's house where they found him standing by his truck.294 The condition 
of the truck, Parson's reaction, and his apparent intoxication provided 
probable cause for his warrantless arrest at the scene.29S 
The State relied on these same facts to characterize the front yard as a 
suspicious place.296 Conceding that no witness connected the suspect or his 
front yard with the offense and that "no one believed that a crime had been 
committed in Parson's front yard," the court nevertheless viewed the premises 
as suspicious.297 The court's holding was based on the suspect's behavior, the 
fact that the officers had been directed to the scene by an informant, and 
evidence found on the suspect's truck.298 
All of this evidence merely supported the officers' belief that the suspect 
286. 842 S.W.2d at 701. 
287. See id. at 702. 
288. See id. at 703. 
289. See id. 
290. See id. at 703-04. 
291 . Id. at 703. The Court of Criminal Appeals previously had justified its holding in Johnson in 
part on the grounds that the suspect's arrest did not ·occur in a place where he could claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy." Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Nowhere in 
its opinion did Houston's First Court of Appeals explain either why the arrestee had no expectation of 
privacy in her garage, or why that fact played no part in deciding whether to apply article 14.03(a)(I). See 
generally Crowley, 842 S.W.2d at 703 (noting the absence of the court's explanation regarding why the 
defendant had no expectation of privacy in her garage and why article 14.03(a)(I) was applicable). 
292. 988 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). 
293 . Id. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. at 268. 
297. Id. at 269. 
298. Seeid. 
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had committed an offense, a point the court of appeals seemed to admit.299 
While the same facts may establish both probable cause and that the place 
where the suspect is found is suspicious, this sort of "double dipping" risks 
reading the arrest exception out of existence. If, as in Muniz, Crowley, and 
now, Parson, the place where the suspect is found becomes "suspicious" 
merely because he is present and acting in a manner consistent with probable 
guilt, then only the rarest case will not support a warrantless arrest. 300 
Cases in which the suspect's vehicle, or the vehicle in which he is riding, 
is the suspicious place sometimes present the same problem.301 Aitch is 
perhaps the clearest example ofthis.302 The suspect was arrested from 'the car 
he was driving after he picked up two men who had committed a robbery 
earlier in a car rented by the suspect. 303 The Mercedes driven by the suspect 
was held to be a suspicious place merely because police had evidence 
connecting the suspect to criminal activity; or, in other words, because the 
police had probable cause.304 The suspect had not used the Mercedes to 
commit the crime and was not at the crime scene committing a crime when he 
was arrested. Similarly, he was not "hiding" or behaving suspiciously. 
At least some of the vehicle cases treat the suspicious place requirement 
seriously.30s Where the suspect was seen driving Nelusive[ly]" through a park 
after picking up a prostitute, the Austin Court of Appeals explained that the 
likelihood of imminent criminal activity transformed the park into a 
suspicious place.306 In other cases in which shots were fired from vehicles, the 
location of the vehicles also were considered suspicious places, not unlike 
other crime scenes.307 
Vehicle accident locations also might be viewed as "crime scenes" under 
some circumstances, although at least one court firmly rejected the argument 
that an accident scene was a suspicious place.30s After acknowledging that 
299. See id. at 268. The court noted that the State's assertion that the front yard was a suspicious 
place was based on "basically the same factors that [the State] argued indicated probable cause." Id . 
. 300. Muniz v. Texas, 85 I S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Parson, 988 S.W.2d at 264; 
Crowley v. Texas, 842 S.W.2d 701, 702-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). 
301. See Aitch v. Texas, 879 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ ref d). 
302. Id. 
303. See id. at 171. 
304. See id. 
305 . See Acosta v. Texas, 868 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ). 
306. See id. 
307. See Cornejo v. Texas, 917 S.W.2d 480,483-84 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ 
refd) (describing that the automobile used in the drive-by shooting and found in the area of the shooting 
was a "suspicious place"); Flores v. Texas, 895 S.W.2d 435, 443 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) 
(showing that the vehicle believed to be involved in the shooting and found in the park was in a 
"suspicious place"); see also Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (explaining 
that the suspect was arrested at the scene ofan illegal entry and stabbing); Douglas v. Texas, 679 S.W.2d 
790, 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ) (showing that the shooting victim was found in the front 
yard of the house where the suspect was arrested). 
308. See Segura v. Texas, 826 S.W.2d 178, 184 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ ref d) (stating "There 
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"[t]he scene of an accident is not a suspicious place per se," another court of 
appeals upheld a warrantless arrest at an accident scene in the early morning 
hours in front of a bar.309 The suspect had a cut on his chin and had been 
drinking, leading the court to hold that "[t]he trial court could have reasonably 
concluded that a parking lot in front of a bar in the wee hours of the morning 
with intoxicated, bleeding people walking around wrecked cars constituted a 
'suspicious place.' "310 
Taken together, these diverse cases interpret article 14.03(a)(1) in very 
different and potentially dangerous ways. One might conclude from 
surveying the efforts of Texas's appellate courts that a "suspicious place" 
warrantless arrest is valid: when the suspect is found at the scene of the 
crime;311 when the suspect is behaving "suspiciously;"JI2 or anytime probable 
cause exists to believe the suspect committed a felony or breach of the 
peace. 313 
The extent to which this understanding of the suspicious place limitation 
undermines the traditional Texas rule requiring arrest warrants cannot be 
overstated. Apparently, a court may resolve virtually any challenge to a 
warrantless arrest simply by characterizing the place in which it occurred as 
suspicious.314 Whatever article 14.03(aXl) originally was intended to mean, 
surely it was not intended to mean nothing. 
X. AVOIDING THE ABSURD: A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF ARTICLE 
14.03(a)(1) 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained quite logically in 
another context that, 
[ilf a statute may reasonably be interpreted in two different ways, a court 
may consider the consequences of differing interpretations in deciding which 
interpretation to adopt. Moreover, if one reasonable interpretation of a 
statute yields absurd results and another interpretation yields no such 
is nothing in the record that would characterize the place of the accident as suspicious."). 
309. Cooper v. Texas, 961 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ refd). 
310. Id. 
311 . See Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421 (discussing suspect arrested at the scene of an illegal entry); 
Douglas, 679 S.W.2d at 791 (describing suspect arrested in front yard of house where victim was found) . 
312. See Muniz v. Texas, 8S1 S.W.2d 238, 2S1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (detailing suspect found 
hiding in closet). 
313. See Texas v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (stating 
suspect arrested in own front yard for "hit and run"); Aitch v. Texas, 879 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ refd) (discussing suspect arrested from car he was driving, not at 
crime scene); Crowley v. Texas, 842 S.W.2d 701, 702-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) 
(stating suspect arrested from her own garage for leaving scene of an accident). 
314. See infra note 317 and accompanying text. 
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absurdities, the latter interpretation should be preferred.lIS 
A preferred interpretation of article 14.03(a)(I), therefore, would avoid the 
absurd result to which "crime scene," "suspicious behavior," and other 
expansive readings of the suspicious place exception have led. 
Courts today bring important new understandings to the task of 
reinterpretation that were unknown to their predecessors. The challenge is to 
reconcile history, constitutional limitations, and text in order to arrive at a 
workable consensus about the contemporary role of article 14.03(a)(1). 
A. History, Constitutional Limits, and Text 
The limited evidence of history is that the nineteenth-century drafters 
intended to promote local ordinances authorizing preventive detention.316 The 
idea of preventive, or investigative, detention understandably stirs deep fears 
of police overreaching, but the practice today is widespread in at least one 
form, constitutionally sanctioned by no less a guardian of individual liberty 
than the Warren Court.3\1 
As has been seen, vague and broad "suspicious person ordinances" are 
not sanctioned, nor are custodial arrests unsupported by probable cause, or 
investigative detentions grounded on nothing more than inarticulable 
hunches.318 These "near-constitutional" laws and practices are understood in 
present-day legal parlance to fall below constitutional minimums.319 As such, 
they comprise, not the constitutional floor for the protections afforded by 
article 14.03(a)(I), but rather the constitutional basement. 
Applied to the current version of the statute, this premise means that 
315. Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 244 (citation omitted). 
316. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.28. 
317. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,11-12 (1968)(finding that field interrogation practices may 
substantially interfere with liberty and personal security; officers' judgement may be colored by the 
·competitive enterprise offerreting out crime· (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948». 
318. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. The Supreme Court has written in regard to the last of these 
concerns that: 
[IJn justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when 
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be 
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And 
in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 
·warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? 
Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted that ·[tJhis demand for specificity in the information upon which 
police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. 
at 21 n.18. 
319. See id. at 21-22. 
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when the language purports to authorize an arrest of a person who is "about 
to commit some offense against the laws, n that wording cannot be given the 
effect contemporary officers, judges, and citizens ordinarily would give it.320 
A custodial arrest leading to prosecution is only for offenses that have been 
committed, or are being committed, and not for those about to be 
committed.321 Similarly, a person who threatens to commit an offense cannot 
be arrested unless the threat itself constitutes a complete offense.322 
Otherwise, a threat is no more than a manifestation of culpability without the 
accompanying prohibited act that transforms it into a punishable offense. 
B. Resolving the "Arrest" Conundrum 
The drafters of the earliest version of article 14.03(a)(I) might have 
actually intended to promote the full, custodial arrest of persons who were 
"about to commit" an offense and who happened to be found in "suspicious 
places." Whatever their intent, no modem court can choose that interpretation 
of the original statutory language.323 Instead, a court might ignore entirely the 
suspicious places and "about to commit language," at least to the extent that 
it purports to authorize something unconstitutional by our lights.324 This 
approach essentially would reduce the suspicious places clause to a precedent 
320. TEx. CODECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I) (Vernon Supp. 2000). 
321 . Lest there be any misunderstanding of this point, attempted offenses-those preparatory acts 
that have begun, but not yet completed the crime-are themselves complete offenses. See TEX. PEN. CODE 
ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon 1994); G. REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN TEXAS 28-35 (2d ed. 
1993 and Supp. 1998). An officer who interrupts the perpetrator, in the example of a burglary, after acts 
amounting to "more than mere preparation" have been undertaken, but before the crime is complete, may 
well have probable cause to arrest, and may do so without a warrant because a crime (attempted burglary) 
"has been committed" in the presence or view of the officer. REAMEY, supra note 321, at 28-35. 
In Hoog v. Texas, the court expressly rejected the State's contention that article 14.03(a)(I) authorizes 
a warrantless arrest for a crime that perhaps is about to be committed but has not been committed yet. 728 
S.W.2d 375, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
322. Some threats suffice to constitute an offense, while "threatening" to commit any offense 
generally is not, by itself, an offense. See Hoog, 728 S.W.2d at 379-80. Therefore, article 14.03(a)(I) 
cannot be read literally to authorize an arrest for every threat to commit some offense. See 10hnson v. 
Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, Johnson might be read to permit a 
warrantless arrest in those cases in which an offense involving a threat, like assault or terroristic threat, has 
been committed: ld. Johnson might also be stating that, as used in article 14.03(a)(I), "threaten" has a 
broader, less legalistic meaning, connoting any kind of incipient illegal action. Id. If this is the meaning 
assigned to the word by the courts, this meaning can only be applied to those situations like temporary, 
investigative detentions supported, at the least, by reasonable suspicion. See id. A real custodial arrest 
can follow only ifprobable cause is developed. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
Id. 
323. See Folladori, supra note 195, at 494-95. 
[Sjerious questions must be raised concerning article 14.03's constitutional validity. First, the 
provision, read literally, gives Texas peace officers authority to arrest in circumstances which 
the Supreme Court in Terry had decreed would only be appropriate for an investigative stop. 
In other words, article 14.03 seems to grant authority to arrest on suspicion, thereby violating 
the requirement that probable cause exist in order for an arrest to be constitutionally valid. 
324. Cf id. at 495 (discussing how the vagueness of a rule can cause unconstitutional results). 
2000] ARRESTS IN TEXAS'S 'SUSPICIOUS PLACES" 971 
condition used exclusively for a warrantless custodial arrest based on probable 
cause.l2' Alternatively, a court might give the words all of the force and effect 
that the Constitution will bear by viewing the language as authorizing a pre-
arrest detention.326 
A court adopting the latter position must be prepared to explain how a 
statute permitting arrest without warrant can apply to any seizure based on 
less than probable cause.327 In fact, the narrow way in which the word "arrest" 
has been used makes it appear to be a significant obstacle.328 This semantic 
difficulty was described decades ago by Professor Walter W. Steele, Jr.: 
One of our most basic conceptual problems is that we are so accustomed to 
the litany of arrest[ s] as ·custody for prosecution" that we lose sight of the 
all-too-frequent, non-prosecutorial uses of the arrest process. For example, 
drunks are sometimes arrested to be sobered up with no thought of 
prosecution. In that instance[,] arrest is used as a convenient substitute for 
more appropriate social services for intoxicated (sick) persons. Furthermore, 
there are numerous instances of persons legally taken into custody to be 
conveyed to the scene of a crime for investigation, rather than for 
prosecution. Apparently we are already willing to tolerate some temporary 
denial of liberty or freedom of movement for reasons other than prosecution. 
Therefore, from the standpoint of reality, "arrest" is defined too narrowly 
when its meaning is restricted to taking a person into custody for the singular 
purpose of prosecution .... The issue is not whether the act is something 
other than an arrest, but whether detention is legal in light of [F]ourth 
[A ]mendment requirements.329 
The court of criminal appeals apparently understands that arrest is not 
a monolithic concept,330 In Linnell v. Texas, an automobile search case, the 
court differentiated between custodial arrests and other, presumably 
noncustodial, arrests.331 Linnett was the driver of a car with an expired 
325. Cf id. (discussing how the vagueness ofa rule can cause unconstitutional reSUlts). 
326. See id. at 494. 
327. See id. The failure to clarify this point leads to the kind of confusion engendered by cases like 
Lara v. Texas. 469 S.W.2d 177, 178-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). When the Court of Criminal Appeals 
in Lara held that the officers observing men running from deserted shacks "had probable cause to be 
suspicious,· it hopelessly muddled the concept of investigative detention grounded in reasonable suspicion 
with that of custodial arrest based on probable cause. See id. at 179. 
328. See Folladori, supra note 195, at 494; supra text accompanying note 327. 
329. Walter W. Steele, Jr., A Proposal to Legitimate Arrestfor Irrvestigation, 27 Sw. L.J. 415,416-
17 (1973) (citations omitted); see Gerald H. Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for 
Inwstigation, 52 IOWA L. REv. 1093, 1105 (1967). 
330. See Linnett v. Texas, 647 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 
331. See id. at 674-75. The court determined that the defendant's traffic ·stop· was not a custodial 
arrest. See id. It did not use the term noncustodial arrest, but the most logical inference from the court's 
decision and reasoning is that a category of noncustodial arrests exists, and that the distinction between 
custodial and noncustodial arrests lies in whether the arrestee is transported to jail and booked. See id. 
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registration.332 After stopping LiMett's vehicle and speaking with the driver, 
the patrol officer looked inside a canister found in the front seat and 
discovered hydromorphone pills.333 Holding that the traffic stop was not a 
"custodial" arrest, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State's 
claim that the warrantless seizure was justified by the "search incident to 
arrest" exception.334 
In a footnote to Linnett, the court observed that the Supreme Court in 
deciding New York v. Belton took note of testimony by a police instructor that 
a " ' full custody arrest' " involves transporting an arrestee" 'to a police 
facility for booking.' lIm At least for purposes of a search incident to arrest, 
the court seemed to adopt this test for distinguishing a custodial arrest from 
a noncustodial arrest.336 
A noncustodial arrest, one not involving transportation to a police facility 
for booking, is almost certainly the kind of temporary detention approved by 
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.337 Just as no distinction was made in 
Terry between a "stop" and an "arrest," there is no need for Texas courts to 
construct a barrier between two equally reasonable forms of detention.338 
Seen in this way, the authority conferred in article 14.03(a)(l) to "arrest, 
without warrant" encompasses both custodial and noncustodial arrests.339 
A noncustodial arrest, or Terry "stop," requires at least reasonable 
suspicion to believe that "criminal activity is afoot."34o The kind of 
preemptive detention approved in Terry allows officers to act on objective 
reason to believe that a crime is about to be committed.341 A temporary 
seizure allows peace officers to maintain the status quo while an investigation 
332. See id. at 673. 
333. See id. 
334. See id. at 675. The "search incident to arrest" exception is discussed in New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981). 
335. Linnell, 647 S.W.2d at 674 n.3. 
336. See id. 
337. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
338. See id. at 17 (rejecting "distinctions between a 'stop' and an 'arrest' "); see also Steele, Jr., 
supra note 329, at 417 (arguing that "[The] Supreme Court has consistently refused to allow basic issues 
to be avoided by ... manipulating labels. "). Of course, each form of "seizure" has its own characteristics. 
See Steele, Jr., supra note 329, at 417. A Terry "stop" is said to be temporary and for the purpose of 
investigation, while an arrest also serves important security interests and may be of much greater duration. 
See id. Nevertheless, each stop is regulated by the Fourth Amendment; each stop must be reasonable; yet, 
each stop involves a substantial interference with liberty. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 10.03. 
Rather than being entirely dissimilar, they are just different varieties of the same species. See id. 
339. TEX. CODECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03(aXI) (Vernon Supp. 2000). 
340. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The term "reasonable suspicion" was not used by the Supreme 
Court in Terry. See;d. However, it has become the shorthand way in which that level of suspicion, less 
than probable cause, justifying a brief investigative detention is described. See id. 
341. Id. This is precisely what occurred in Terry. Id. at 5-7. Officer McFadden saw men who 
appeared to be "s;asing" a retail shop in preparation for a daylight robbery. See id. He approached the 
men, questioned them, and eventually frisked them before probable cause developed to believe they had 
committed any crime. See id. 
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is conducted and to "preserve the peace" by halting what the officer 
reasonably believes to be an incipient criminal act.342 A custodial arrest, on 
the other hand, requires probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being 
committed, not that one is about to be committed.343 Consequently, the arrest 
authority of article 14.03(a)(1) where "circumstances .. . reasonably show that 
such persons . . . threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the 
laws" is wholly consistent with the holding of Terry and supports both 
noncustodial and custodial arrests. 344 
Reading article 14.03(a)(1) to authorize both custodial and noncustodial 
arrests solves the problem of what to au "vith the "threaten, or are about to 
commit" language, a clause that Texas' appellate courts heretofore have 
avoided assiduously.J4S This reading also solves the persistent question of 
what provision of Texas law authorizes an investigative detention 
(noncustodial arrest).J46 
Perhaps serendipitously, the drafters of the original version of article 
14.03(a)(l) created a "reasonably show" standard rather than relying on 
probable cause, a term that certainly was known to them.347 Narrowly viewed 
as authority for warrantless custodial arrests only, "reasonably show" has been 
interpreted as the equivalent of probable cause.348 This interpretation, while 
clearly necessary due to constitutional concerns, is a bit odd. Why use the 
342. TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1977) (Slating "It is the duty of every peace 
officer to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction."). 
343 . See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.02(A) (2d ed. 1996); see 
also Hoag v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 375, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (finding that article 14.03(a)(I) docs 
not support arrest where crime has not yet been committed). 
344. TEX. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. ·14.03(a)(l) (emphasis added). Discussing the intent of the 
drafters of the 1856 version of article 14.03(a)(I), Professors Dawson and Dix seem to concur that giving 
"arrest" a more expansive reading is consistent with the statute's original purpose: 
Despite the use of the term "arrest," this [1856 statute] most likely was viewed as delegating 
to local authorities the power to provide by ordinance for law enforcement officers to 
preventively intervene when they encountered suspicious persons .. . In any case, the statute 
seems originally to have been designed to legitimize what today are investigatory stops and 
perhaps formal proceedings under ordinances that today would certainly be regarded as 
constitutionally offensive. 
DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.28. 
345. TEX. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I). No doubt courts have avoided discussing this 
clause because it is so clearly out of place in a provision that is read as authorizing a warrantless custodial 
arrest on probable cause. Opinions in which Terry stops developed into probable cause and custodial 
arrests, typically gloss over the "poor fit" of article 14.03(a)(I). See Meeks v. Texas, 653 S.W.2d 6, 12-13 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hamel v. Texas, 582 S.W.2d 424, 426-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Sheffield v. 
Texas, 647 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref d). 
346. See Dlx & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 10.03 (stating "[Terry) detentions are not explicitly 
authorized by Texas statutory law."}. 
347. TEx. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I). 
348. Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In Johnson, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, after quoting article 14.03, stated clearly that "[c]ircumstances within the knowledge 
of a peace officer which reasonably show that a particular person is guilty of a felony is the functional 
equivalent of probable cause to believe that a particular person has committed a felony." Id. 
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tenn "reasonably show" instead of simply requiring probable cause, unless the 
tenn was chosen to serve a broader purpose?349 In any event, interpreting the 
current article 14.03(a)(1) to authorize investigative detentions based on 
reasonable suspicion is facilitated, and not at all inhibited, by the broad 
requirement that "circumstances ... reasonably show" a person is "about to 
commit some offense. 11350 
History, text, and constitutional concerns all are satisfied, therefore, by 
explicit recognition of article 14.03(aX 1) as authority for noncustodial arrests 
or investigative detentions.351 Even precedent stands on the side of this use.m 
What remains is to detennine the way in which the suspicious places 
requirement properly limits the application of article 14.03(aX 1 ).353 
C. "Suspicious Places II Revisited 
The starting premise for any exception to a rule of law must be that the 
exception not swallow the rule.354 Texas cases interpreting the suspicious 
places requirement come dangerously close to doing just that.3SS This is 
especially true in those cases upholding arrests merely because probable cause 
exists to believe the defendant committed an offense, or because the suspect 
is hiding or otherwise behaving suspiciously, but in a non-criminal way, at the 
place.3'6 These cases threaten to eviscerate the strong, long-standing Texas 
tradition of requiring arrest by warrant in the absence of manifest necessity.m 
349. The term "reasonable suspicion" was unknown to the drafters; it first appeared more than a 
hundred years after the first version of article 14.03. Notwithstanding that the drafters would not have 
known the term, it is not inconceivable that they understood the sense of it. They might have avoided use 
of "probable cause" preCisely because they intended to promote investigative detentions other than 
custodial arrests and deliberately chose a somewhat more expansive term to describe the required quantum 
of suspicion necessary for those detentions. 
350. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I). 
351. See discussion supra Part X.A, B. 
352. See Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421. Citing numerous cases, the court of criminal appeals noted 
in Johnson, albeit without elaboration, "In the past, Article 14.03(a) and its predecessor Article 14.03 have 
served as authorization for limited investigatory field detentions which occurred in a variety of places and 
as subsequent validation for warrantless arrests based upon probable cause." Id. 
353. Id. (arguing that "14.03 should be applied to authorize warrantless arrests in only limited 
situations"); DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30 (stating °The requirement of a 'suspicious place' . .. 
is the major limitation upon the coverage of the statute"). 
354. See DIX & DAWSON, supra note 7, § 9.30 (discussing how "Article 14.03(a)(I) obviously 
should not be so broadly construed as to overshadow the general rule that arrest warrants are required,"). 
355. Id. 
356. See. e.g., Muniz v. Texas, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)(suspect found hiding 
in closet); Texas v. Parson, 988 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (suspect arrested 
in own front yard for °hit and run"); Aitch v. Texas, 879 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1994, writ refd) (suspect arrested from car he was driving, not at crime scene); Crowley v. Texas, 
842 S.W.2d 701, 702'()8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (suspect arrested from her own 
garage for leaving scene of an accident). 
357. See Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (quoting 6 TEX. 
JUR. 20 Arrest § 12 (1959) and explaining that provisions for warrantless arrests are "founded in the law 
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If a warrant exception means anything, it must mean that excusing 
circumstances exist that overcome the benefits of the warrant process.358 
Stated · differently, the strong presumption in favor of a warrant must be 
rebutted; reasonableness must be satisfied in some other manner.3S9 With this 
guiding principle in mind, it is possible to discern features of suspicious 
places that do little or no violence to the interests a warrant requirement is 
designed to protect. 
When one thinks about what makes a place suspicious, the court's often-
repeated rubric that "few, if any, places are suspicious in and of themselves" 
quickly comes to mind.360 Logically, a place is either inherently suspicious 
because of environmental characteristics or transiently suspicious due to 
activities on the site.361 For purposes of construing article I 4.03(a)(l), static 
environmental factors play no important role. 
To illustrate this point, consider a high-crime neighborhood and a low-
crime neighborhood. If one labels the former a suspicious place, and quite 
apart from the difficulty in deciding what constitutes "high-crime" or where 
the boundaries of such areas lie, then an arrest may always be executed 
without a warrant in that neighborhood. The blanket characterization of an 
entire area as suspicious would deprive persons living or working there of 
warrant protection merely because of their physical location. At the same 
time, warrantless arrests in the "low-crime" neighborhood would never be 
justified by the character of the neighborhood; they would depend, instead, on 
other situational factors excusing the warrant. 
The court of criminal appeals probably had this distinction in mind when 
it observed that "additional facts available to an officer plus reasonable 
inferences from those facts in relation to a particular place may arouse 
justifiable suspicion."362 Ifit is the activity in a place that makes it suspicious, 
rather than static characteristics, one can begin to define suspicious places by 
permitting warrantless arrests where criminal activity is occurring at the time 
law enforcement officers intervene.363 Similarly, a noncustodial arrest might 
occur in a suspicious place where an officer reasonably suspects that a crime 
is about to occur.364 
In each of these cases, society has an strong interest in stopping the 
of necessity") . 
358. See discussion supra Part v. 
359. See discussion supra Part V. 
360. Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
361. Compare Carey V. Texas, 695 S.W.2d 30, 308-09 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) 
(holding that a hospital is not a suspicious place), with Thomas v. Texas, 681 S.W.2d 672, 674, 676 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd) (holding that a street, although not inherently suspicious, was 
a suspicious place under the circumstances). 
362. Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421. 
363. See id. 
364. See Carey, 695 S.W.2d at 309-12. 
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criminal activity before persons are injured or property is stolen or 
damaged.365 The danger is imminent, and the potential for harm is great.366 
It seems clear then, that a place is suspicious and a warrantless seizure should 
be allowed anywhere someone is actively engaged in crime.367 However, this 
understanding of suspicious place provides only a starting point. It merely 
states the easiest and most obvious way in which the statutory exception 
operates.368 
If an officer observes a crime being committed, he also may arrest 
without a warrant because the offense is in the officer's "presence or view," 
another exception to the warrant requirement.369 For a crime about to be 
committed, and for reasons discussed previously, a noncustodial arrest could 
be effected pursuant to article 14.03(a)(l) if reasonable suspicion exists.370 
The difficulty comes in defining a "suspicious place," after the offense 
is complete. While the court of criminal appeals could have read article 
14.03(a)(l) to apply only in those cases in which a crime is being, or is about 
to be, committed, it did not choose that path, and it is late in the day to depart 
so radically from a position already taken.371 
Necessity is the guiding principle in interpreting warrant exceptions.372 
Therefore, not every crime scene qualifies as a suspicious place excusing a 
warrant.373 The correct question in crime scene cases is not whether an 
offense was committed at the place where the suspect is found, but whether 
some reason exists not to obtain prior judicial approval for the arrest.374 A 
certain level of exigency usually accompanies the bringing together of a 
suspect, criminal evidence (which may be evanescent), and probable cause in 
365. See discussion supra Part VI. 
366. See discussion supra Part VI. 
367. See discussion supra Part VI. 
368. See discussion supra Part VI. 
369. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977). Ultimately, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals explained the warrantless arrest in Lara v. Texas by holding that the suspect was under 
the influence ofa drug while in the officer's presence. 469 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). The 
court instead might have validated the detention on the grounds that the officer had reasonable suspicion 
to believe the suspect had committed a crime. See id. 
370. See discussion supra Part VI. 
371 . The court could interpret article 14.03(aXI) to apply only to noncustodial arrests (Terry stops). 
If it did so, the difficulty in defining "suspicious places" would vanish, subsumed within the more general 
determination ofwhethcr "reasonable suspicion" existed to believe "criminal activity was afoot." See Terry 
v . Ohio, 392 u.s. 1,21-22 (1968). In 1969, noted criminal defense lawyer Emmett Colvin, Jr., read the 
statute in just this way: "It would appear, therefore, that the Texas statute gives no particular power to an 
officer in addition to that he already possesses under Terry." Emmett Colvin, Jr., Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 23 SW. L.1. 223,224-25 (1969). This eventuality today seems especially unlikely, given the 
court's long-standing application of the provision to custodial arrests. 
372. See Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (quoting 6 TEX. 
JUR. 2d Arrest § 12 (1959) and explaining that provisions for warrantless arrests are "founded in the law 
of necessity"). 
373. See id. 
374. See Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
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the place where the offense occurred. m 
Johnson v. Texas illustrates this point.376 The suspect appeared on the 
crime scene wearing blood-stained clothing and reacting nervously.377 His 
keys were found in the apartment where the murder victim was stabbed.378 
Had he been permitted to leave the scene while a warrant was obtained, 
Johnson could have disposed of his clothes, and might have fled to avoid 
apprehension. In short, the place where he was found took on a suspicious 
cast when the evidence came together in such a way that Johnson became the 
prime suspect, and there were good reasons to take the suspect into custody 
immediately.379 
The obvious problem raised by this illustration, and most situations 
where a suspect is found at the crime scene, is that some flight risk always 
will be present. Flight is the quintessential exigent circumstance in the arrest 
context, and Texas law provides specifically for that factor in a warrant 
exception statute separate from article 14.03(aXl).380 The possibility of flight 
should not suffice, therefore, to transform a crime scene into a suspicious 
place, especially since article 14.03(a)(1) has a broader reach than the 
provision authorizing warrantless arrest of an offender "about to escape."3SI 
One warrant exception for flight seems quite enough.382 
Johnson does not violate this analytical principle. Rather, it represents 
what might be called a "flight-plus" case. Not only was there reason to fear 
that Johnson would flee if not taken into custody immediately, but there also 
were evidentiary and security concerns that required quick police action.383 
Johnson was wearing trousers that appeared to be blood-stained and could be 
crucial evidence in the investigation.3M He identified as his keys found inside 
375. See Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 664-65. 
376. 722S.W.2dat417. 
377. See id. at419. 
378. See id. 
379. See id. at 421. The level of suspicion regarding Johnson and his participation in the crime 
grew from nonexistent to probable cause in the space of a very short time. See id. at 419-20. Police had 
virtually no reason to think he was involved when he arrived at the crime scene. See id. His actions, a 
blood stain on his pants, identification of his keys, and the strong suspicion that the murder was an inside 
job coalesced to catapult Johnson into the forefront of the investigation. See id. 
380. See TEx. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977). 
381. Id. arts. 14.03(a)(l), 14.04. 
382. See id. Obviously, multiple standards accounting for the possibility of flight only confuse the 
issue. To avoid just such confusion, specific statutory provisions ordinarily are deemed to control over 
general ones. Because article 14.03(a)(l) addresses broad ·places and circumstances· and applies to a wide 
range of felonies and misdemeanors, while article 14.04 deals specifically with flight to avoid capture and 
only in felony cases, principles of code construction militate against treating flight risk as the controlling 
factor in ·suspicious places· cases. See id. In order to avoid confusion and redundancy, courts must 
construe article 14.03(a)(l) as permitting warrantless arrests in situations distinct from those contemplated 
by other warrant exceptions. See id. 
383. See Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 419-21. 
384. Seeid. at419. 
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the victim's apartment.385 Also, the crime was a particularly violent and 
savage one, involving a break-in and brutal stabbing.386 Evidence was 
collected and Johnson was arrested shortly after the offense had been 
committed, and there was considerable interest in quickly confirming or 
dispelling the strong suspicion that Johnson was the perpetrator.387 
Characterizing every crime scene as a suspicious place does more than 
ignore the proper balancing of individual liberty interests against the 
government's interest in a speedy arrest. It creates two dangerous incentives 
for law enforcement officers. First, they may be inclined to rush to judgement 
in order to take advantage of the fleeting opportunity to arrest without 
warrant. A blanket crime scene exception exalts place over suspicion and 
rewards officers for acting quickly rather than thoroughly.388 When this 
environment is created, innocent citizens will be arrested without adequate 
suspicion.389 
Secondly, in order to arrest without a warrant, officers may be tempted 
to bring the suspect within the area of the crime scene, not for legitimate 
investigative purposes, but merely to create the required suspicious place.390 
The court of criminal appeals previously has rejected just this kind of create-
an-exigency police work, holding that a warrantless arrest cannot be justified 
by a confrontation that is contrived to avoid the warrant requirement.391 
As to places other than the crime scene-that is, places where no crime 
has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur-courts must make clear that 
warrantless arrests are not permitted by article 14.03(a)(I).392 Neither 
385. See id. 
386. Seeid. at418. 
387. See id. at 419-20. Johnson was arrested within two hours of the stabbing. See id. at 420. If 
it turned out that Johnson had not committed the crime, the investigation could be redirected to discovering 
and apprehending the actual perpetrator. See id. On the other hand, if it could be determined by 
interrogation or further investigation that Johnson was the attacker, that would calm security concerns for 
the woman living in the apartment where the victim was stabbed, as well as for other residents of the 
apartment complex. See id. 
388. See discussion supra Part IX. 
389. See discussion supra Part X.A. 
390. See Beasley v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
391. See id. The court held unlawful a warrantless arrest and explained that: 
The confrontation in the instant case is of the sort we suggest in West v. Texas, 720 
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986, decided September 17, 1986) would not satisfy the rule of 
that case that, where probable cause is established in a suspect's presence, and the 
confrontations [sic] with the suspect is not contrived in order to permit an otherwise improper 
warrantless arrest, under circumstances which make it likely the suspect will flee, a warrantless 
arrest is permissible. 
Id. The court concluded that the warrantless arrest in Beasley was unlawful because the' officers could 
have confirmed or dispelled their suspicions about the defendant's participation in the crime without 
confronting him and thereby creating a reason to believe he would flee. Id.; compare id., with Johnson 
v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (noting that on the facts of the case "the presence 
of appellant was not contrived by law enforcement officials to circumvent the procurement of a warrant"). 
392. See Muniz v. Texas, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 
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necessity nor common sense support the extension of the suspicious place 
exception to every location in which the arrestee might be found.393 Whether 
the suspect is acting suspiciously by hiding makes no substantive difference 
in determining whether a warrant is required.394 The relevant inquiry, and the 
one required by the text of article 14.03(a)(1), is whether the place where the 
suspect is arrested has been made suspicious by recent or incipient criminal 
activity.395 Noncriminal behavior, no matter how curious or peculiar, lacks the 
aspect of exigency necessary to excuse a warrant. 396 
XI. CONCLUSION 
A considerable legal superstructure is built on the premise that arrests in 
Texas must be by warrant unless a statutory exception exists.397 Despite the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' recent holding that the Texas Constitution 
is not the source of that premise, the Texas Legislature continues to act as if 
statutory warrant exceptions are required.398 For so long as the Legislature 
and courts insist on warrants or some narrowly-defined alternative, provisions 
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure like article 14.03(a)(l) will continue 
to protect Texas citizens against the dangers of arrest powers administered 
without external supervision by officers Nengaged in the often competitive 
. enterprise of ferreting out crime. "399 
Not only is the warrant exception scheme an example of sound criminal 
justice policy, but it also symbolizes the strength of Texas's commitment to 
prior judicial approval of arrests.4OO As the Supreme Court of the United 
States said in Beck v. Ohio: 
393. See id. Muniz, the case in which the suspect was found hiding in a closet, is simply 
insupportable on grounds of text, precedent, or logic. Jd. Its primary virtue as an opinion is to demonstrate 
how easily article 14.03(a)(I) can be transformed from a limiled exception to a universal excuse for 
avoiding prior judicial approval of arrests. See id. 
394. See id. at 250-5 I. To the extent that hiding gives police reason to believe that the offender is 
·about to escape," it is relevant for purposes of article 14.04, but not in creating the ·suspicious places' 
required by article 14.03(a)(I). See id. 
395 . See id. at 250. 
396. See id. at 250-5 I. 
397. See supra Part II. 
398. See Hulit v. Texas, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Even after Hulil was 
decided, Texas's 76th Legislature amended article 14.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, modifying 
the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
14.03 (Vernon Supp. 2000). There is no reason to believe the Legislature would continue to provide 
statutorily for warrant exceptions if it was persuaded that arrest warrants are not required in Texas law. 
See id. The legislature mayor may not agree that the Texas Constitution is not the source of the warrant 
requirement, but its acceptance of the requirement seems obvious. See id. 
399. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
400. See supra Parts V, VI. 
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An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an 
objective predetennination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far 
less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or 
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of 
hindsight judgment . . .. 
. . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion of the 
police.401 
This sentiment is reflected in Texas's unusually strong and long-standing 
demand for arrest warrants, and in the serious way in which Texas courts 
usually have applied exceptions to the rule.402 Indeed, the passage from Beck 
was quoted verbatim by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in striking down 
a warrantless arrest.403 
In the final analysis, a rule/exception regime is only as good as the 
quality of analysis and dedication to purpose used in construing the 
exceptions. If the exceptions are not applied rigorously and with a strong 
sense of the principles that guide the rule, the rule itself becomes mere 
window-dressing.404 
For several reasons, some apparent and some not, Texas courts have had 
varying degrees of success in interpreting article 14.03(a)(1).405 An obvious 
difficulty is that the legislative intent behind passage of the 1856 statute has 
become obscured by time and, more importantly, by a significantly changed 
way of viewing constitutional constraints.406 This has left modem courts in 
the precarious position of reading into the statute meanings it probably never 
was intended to have and simultaneously reading out of the statute meanings 
that almost certainly were intended.407 
To the extent it is possible to discern what was intended originally, 
construing the current statute to permit investigative detentions based on 
reasonable suspicion does no violence to history and also is supported by 
precedent.408 In order to resolve the question of whether, and how, article 
14.03(a)(I) applies to detentions other than custodial arrests, the court of 
criminal appeals should explain carefully what it previously has hinted: 
arrests may be noncustodial as well as custodial.409 Noncustodial arrests based 
401. 379 U.S. 89, 96·97 (1964). 
402. See supra Parts VI, VII. 
403. See Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
404. See supra Part VIII. 
405. See discussion supra Part VII . 
406. See discussion supra Part VIII. 
407. See supra Part VIII. 
408. See discussion supra Part x. 
409. See discussion supra Part X. C. 
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on reasonable suspicion and "circumstances which reasonably show" that 
someone has committed or is "about to commit" some offense, are 
constitutionally sound and within the scope of article 14.03(a)(l).410 
The court also must make clear that when the statute is used to justify a 
warrantless custodial arrest, probable cause is the appropriate standard.411 
Authority is not granted to intervene before an offense actually has been 
committed.412 In custodial arrest situations, the suspicious places requirement 
must be confined strictly to conserve the purposes of the arrest warrant 
requirement. 413 
Arrests at a crime scene must be supported by more than the coincidence 
of probable cause and the presence of the suspect.414 To do otherwise is to 
convert crime scene into a talisman before which the arrest warrant rule 
disappears.415 An example of two situations typically confronting law 
enforcement officers illustrates the working of this "crime scene-plus" 
approach: If an officer arrives at the scene of a traffic accident and discovers 
that one of the drivers is intoxicated and poses a danger to himself, the officer 
should be able to arrest without a warrant.416 Such an arrest is justified by 
article 14.01 because an offense, public intoxication, is occurring in the 
"presence or view" of the officer.417 It also is justified by article 14.03(a)(1) 
because the suspect was arr~sted at the crime scene, the place where the 
suspect was driving while intoxicated shortly before the officer arrived.418 
Evanescent evidence (blood alcohol level) will be lost if arrest is delayed to 
obtain a warrant, and the intoxicated person may be injured if not taken into 
custody.419 Moreover, the suspect is in a public place and not in the relative 
safety and privacy of his or her home.42o 
Contrast this situation to one in which neither driver is intoxicated, but 
410. TEX. CODECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 2000); see discussion supra Part 
X. 
411. See BARTON, supra note 8, § 1.024 ("Article 14.03(a)(l) does not authorize a warrantless arrest 
upon mere 'suspicion.' "). 
412. The Court of Criminal Appeals made this point on one occasion. See Hoag v. Texas, 728 
S.W.2d 375, 379·80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
413. See Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W. 417, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
414. See id. 
415. See discussion supra Part X.B.c. 
416. See Beard v. Texas, 5 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.). 
417. TEX.CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977); see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 49.02 
(Vernon Supp. 2000). 
418. See TEX. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(I). 
419. See Beard, 5 S.W.3d at 886. 
420. Cj. Honeycutt v. Texas, 499 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that warrantless 
arrest ofDWI suspect in her home was not justified by exigency). It is unclear exactly what part privacy, 
or the reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspect might have in the "place," plays in the decision to 
arrest without warrant, but it may have some significance to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See 
id.; Johnson v. Texas, 722 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that suspect's arrest did not 
'occur in a place where he could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy"). 
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one of them was driving with a suspended license. The place of the accident 
is just as much a crime scene, but no "plus" factors support arresting without 
a warrant. There are no safety concerns; there is no evanescent evidence. To 
call this crime scene a suspicious place effectively reduces that requirement 
to a showing that a suspect for whom probable cause existed was found in a 
public place. 
A more purposive approach avoids the illogic sometimes seen in 
appellate courts' attempts to define suspicious places.421 Analysis by broad 
categorization or by forming Ubright-line rules" has a surface appeal but, 
ultimately, is unsatisfactory as a way to make decisions in cases that 
necessarily involve a wide variety of settings. 422 As Chief Justice Earl Warren 
wrote in Terry v. Ohio, "No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean 
variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case 
before US."423 
A more nuanced analysis of suspicious places means that sometimes the 
suspect's own residence might be such a place, but often it will not.424 An 
accident scene or other crime scene could qualify, but it will not necessarily.4~ 
Shots fired from a vehicle might make that place suspicious, while a vehicle 
not being used for criminal activity would not be suspicious. In each case, the 
appellate court must explain carefully and thoroughly which facts justify 
departure from the warrant procedure. When this degree of analysis becomes 
commonplace, decisions simultaneously will become more consistent and 
outcomes will become more predictable.426 The law of 1856 will acquire an 
integrity and longevity that will insure its continued vitality well into the next 
millennium. 
421 . See discussion supra Part IX. 
422. See Reamey, supra note 13, at 81-88. 
423. 392 U.S. I, IS (1968). 
424. See Johnson, 722 S.W.2d at 421. 
425. See Douglas v. Texas, 679 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, no writ). 
426. See discussion supra Part X. 
